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1Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors: A Critical Look at the Antidepressants and an Assessment of Potential Liability Faced by their Manufacturers
Abstract
Mental health is a growing and lucrative aspect of health-care. Among the ways of treating
mental illness is through use of antidepressant medications, including selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). This paper will address much of the critical commentary made
about the SSRIs, and will consider whether the problems with this class of drugs could
result in liability to the manufacturers. Included in the critique of the SSRIs is a look at
whether SSRIs, including Prozac, Paxil, Zoloft, Luvox, and Celexa, are linked to violent or
suicidal behavior. This paper will also consider the existence and eﬀects of any withdrawal
syndrome associated with these drugs. Finally, the paper will consider whether the drugs
are over-prescribed, including a look at whether children should be prescribed SSRIs given
that little FDA scrutiny has been given to the eﬀects of these drugs on children.
I. Introduction
Mental health issues, and the ability and willingness of those who suﬀer from mental health problems to
seek medical help, have changed drastically in recent years. According to a governmental study of mental
health, Americans have achieved a “greater scientiﬁc understanding of mental illness” from the 1950s to
21996.1The same study found that the last half-century has seen “remarkable advances in the understanding
of mental health disorders...and in our appreciation of the centrality of mental health to overall health
and well-being.”2The stigma and taboo of being designated as “crazy” have been replaced3by widespread
acknowledgment that depression and other common mental maladies are legitimate “diseases”. It is notable,
however, that some critics of the current mental health system in the United States, including Dr. Peter
Breggin,4object to the “disease” label being placed on mental health issues.5
The increases in education and acceptance of mental health issues appear to create many positive eﬀects, in-
cluding increased likelihood that those suﬀering from mental illness will seek professional help.6The downside
of an increased acceptance of mental health problems as legitimate medical conditions, however, is that the
1Surgeon General of the United States, Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General ch. 1, (1999)
<http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/home.html>.
2Id.
3While the medical community generally recognizes the validity of mental health problems as illness, the Surgeon General’s
mental health report discusses the still lingering stigma associated with mental problems by the general public. The report
stresses that the social and economic impact of stigma can be severe, and notes the importance if eliminating such stigma.
Although the public is more educated in general, the study notes that the public has developed, since the 1950s, more of an
association between mental illness and violent behavior. The study attributes this fear to media coverage and sensationalizing
of violent actions by the mentally ill, and lists the public fear of violence as a primary reason for the remaining stigma against
the mentally ill. Id.
4Dr. Peter Breggin has worked as an expert witness for plaintiﬀs in several cases against the manufacturers of SSRIs. He
has written several books discussing the problems with using these types of medication to treat psychological problems. He is
a psychiatrist who attended Case Western Reserve Medical School, went on to become a teaching fellow at Harvard Medical
School, and has taught at various other universities. His website may be found at www.breggin.com. See Peter R. Breggin,
M.D., The Antidepressant Fact Book 226 (2001).
5Dr. Breggin insists that depression should not be categorized as a disease. Instead, he believes it should be characterized as
a “natural or normal human response to emotional injury and loss.” He believes that feelings, no matter how extreme, should
not be confused with diseases. Id. at 14. Despite this view, depression and other common mental health problems are generally
known as diseases in medical and layperson circles, and thus they will be referred to as diseases or illnesses throughout this
paper.
6The Surgeon General’s mental health report states that remaining stigma may keep the rate of those suﬀering from mental
illness who seek medical help lower than it should be. It cites studies from the 1990s claiming that “nearly two-thirds of
all people with diagnosable mental disorders do not seek treatment.” Those most aﬀected by the stigma, according to this
report, are children and people from rural areas. Despite all of this, the report does aﬃrm that, as compared to the 1950s
and 1970s, “people were likelier than in the past to approach mental illness by coping with, rather than by avoiding, the
problem.” See Surgeon General of the United States, Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General ch. 1,
(1999) <http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/home.html>.
3aﬀected parties may often be seeking and/or receiving ineﬀective or inappropriate help. With the acceptance
of mental illness as a disease came the creation of a lucrative market for pharmaceutical products to “cure”
the disease. Many of the major pharmaceutical manufacturers have successfully entered this market, and
have gone to great lengths to attract consumers for their products.
The problem with treating mental health problems with drugs comes largely from two fronts. First, some
mental health professionals and other critics of antidepressant medications feel that addressing the underlying
problems, through treatments such as old-fashioned therapy, is the only way to truly help with the problems
that manifest themselves as mental illness. These critics are concerned that today’s patients are simply being
prescribed very potent antidepressant drugs by general practitioners, rather than trained psychiatrists, who
understand neither the depth and nature of the mental illness nor the eﬀectiveness and dangers of the pre-
scribed drugs. This issue will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper, particularly with regard to the
issue of over-prescription of antidepressant medications and the growing evidence regarding antidepressant
withdrawal symptoms.
A second problem, according to some critics, is that many of the antidepressants do not help the mental
health of the patient, and that they in fact are known to actually worsen some conditions.7This alleged
problem is one that consists largely of competing scientiﬁc studies, and questions about the methods and
validity of these studies. Given that the FDA and similar agencies around the world have approved many
antidepressant drugs, the critics in this area are clearly losing their battle against the antidepressant manu-
facturers.
In the wake of the described changes in mental health education and perceived problems in curing mental
7See Peter R. Breggin, M.D., The Antidepressant Fact Book (2001) (asserting that the antidepressants are powerful
stimulants that may cause mania, brain damage, and even depression, as well as other problems).
4illness lies many questions concerning the potential liability faced by drug manufacturers to those individuals
who are allegedly hurt by antidepressant drugs. This paper seeks to examine these liability issues, with a
speciﬁc emphasis on the manufacturers of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (“SSRIs”)8, which have
become some of the most commonly prescribed and lucrative drugs for their manufacturers.9I will approach
my consideration of these liability issues by separately documenting concerns of three diﬀerent kinds.
First, there is the question of whether SSRIs cause those who take them to sometimes act violently towards
themselves and/or others. This has been the most common claim of plaintiﬀs against the manufacturers,
and I will examine the most important cases and what those cases may mean to the future of such litigation.
Second, there is growing concern that the SSRIs may cause a withdrawal syndrome with debilitating side
eﬀects for some people who stop taking the drugs. I will examine the research in this area and discuss
the prospect of lawsuits, which have actually already begun in the form of class actions and other types of
litigation brought by plaintiﬀs who claim to be suﬀering from this syndrome.
Finally, and most broadly, I will address the debate over whether the SSRIs are over-prescribed. Those who
believe this is the case argue that drug manufacturers are encouraging that their drugs be used to treat a
multitude of less serious problems in an attempt to bring everyone, including children, within the umbrella
of people who may be prescribed SSRIs and other mental health drugs. Related to this is the concern that
doctors who do not have experience or special expertise in mental health issues are regularly diagnosing
mental problems and treating them with SSRIs and other antidepressants, whereas mental health experts
might decide to treat the problems of the patient with therapy or other means.
8The SSRIs include the following drugs: Prozac, Zoloft, Paxil, Celexa, and Luvox. See id. at 1.
9According to Dr. Breggin’s book, Eli Lilly & Co. claimed that more than 35 million people had taken Prozac as of 2000.
Additionally, Prozac produced more than $2.5 billion in revenue for Eli Lilly & Co. in 1999. Combined 1999 sales of Prozac,
Zoloft, and Paxil topped $4 billion. See id.
5Supporters of the current method of care, however, claim that increased research and education have enabled
those suﬀering from mental disorders to now seek the kind of help that allows them to live more normal lives.
They believe that today’s antidepressants are important and safe innovations that respond appropriately to
many problems that were previously almost impossible to treat, especially given that very few people can
aﬀord personal counseling that is often suggested as an alternative to antidepressant medications.
A. The Science of SSRIs
Although this paper does not seek to examine these drugs from a technical medical standpoint, it is important
to summarize at a basic level what an SSRI is and what it does. The SSRIs, as the name suggests, “work
by blocking the absorption of the brain chemical serotonin, making more of it available to brain cells.”10Dr.
Breggin, who will throughout this paper be cited as one of the most notable spokesmen against the use of
SSRIs, oﬀers a rather understandable summary of the workings of SSRIs:
“Serotonin is a neurotransmitter or chemical messenger that is released by one nerve cell or
neutron to make another neutron ﬁre. The serotonin is released into the synapse or space
between the neurons. In the natural course of events, the serotonin is then chemically de-
stroyed or reabsorbed back into the cell that originally released it. But SSRI antidepressants
block the reabsorption (reuptake) of the serotonin, causing an excess amount of serotonin
to accumulate in the synapse. With more serotonin in the synapse, the theory suggests, the
activity of the system will increase.”11
While there are diﬀerent SSRIs available with diﬀerent chemical make-ups, the general assumption is that
these drugs can be discussed as a group for purposes of this paper because they all have the same basic eﬀect
on the brain.12Where there are material diﬀerences in the speciﬁc drugs, such as with the half-life of each,
10Claudine Chamberlain, Prozac Prosecution Rests (visited Feb. 24, 2002) <http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/living/InYourHead/allinyourhead 45.html>.
12See id. at 29 (stating that “Prozac, Zoloft, Paxil, Celexa, and Luvox are so similar that for most purposes they can be
discussed together”).
6that diﬀerence will be speciﬁed as necessary.
A major scientiﬁc question that aﬀects the way that mental illness is discussed involves whether mental
disorders are manifested, and thus can be detected, in some physical way that can be clearly seen for
diagnostic purposes. The National Institute of Mental Health takes the position, in the “Science Education”
section of its web site, that imaging technology can reveal pictorial evidence to show the diﬀerence in brain
activity of a normal person and one suﬀering from mental illness.13This imaging technology includes Positron
Emission Technology (PET), Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), and Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imagine (fMRI).14Dr. Breggin disagrees with the contention that such imaging can prove the diﬀerences in
brains between normal brains and those aﬀected with mental illness. He says that “doctors cannot diagnose
depression from a normal brain scan because there are no consistent diﬀerences from normal brain scans.”15As
an example supporting his position, he cites an actual Prozac advertisement in which a disclaimer appears on
the advertisement to indicate that the brain PET scan image shown in the advertisement does not actually
indicate a depressed patient.16
B. Prescription Drug Liability – General
13National Institute of Mental Health, (last modiﬁed Sept. 22, 1999) <http://www.nimh.nih.gov/hotsci/hotsci.htm>. Pic-
tures are oﬀered on this web site to demonstrate the various activities of the brain when aﬀected by various mental illnesses.
14See id.
15Peter R. Breggin, M.D., The Antidepressant Fact Book 23 (2001).
16See id. Breggin goes on to say that the “FDA regulations on truth and fairness in advertising undoubtedly required this
disclaimer but the advertisement’s impact is hardly truthful or fair.” This ﬁnal assertion is based on Breggin’s belief that the
disclaimer is hidden on the periphery of the image of the brain and other primary substance of the advertisement. It should be
noted that this advertisement was targeted to a sophisticated audience, as it appeared on January 19, 2001 on the back cover
of the “Psychiatric News”, which is the oﬃcial newspaper of the American Psychiatric Association. Id.
7It is essential, before speciﬁcally discussing the speciﬁc liability issues of SSRI manufacturers, to review the
basic standards for imposing tort liability on the manufacturers of prescription drugs. A fairly comprehensive
and realistic view of the standards of liability for prescription drug makers appears in the Restatement (Third)
of Torts.17Section 6 of the Restatement is entitled “Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm
Caused by Defective Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices”.18
The Restatement describes that the drug maker is subject to liability for selling or distributing a defective
product.19The product defect can involve a design or manufacturing defect, which basically means that
the drug causes harm when used properly.20The standard for establishing defective design is an extremely
diﬃcult one for any plaintiﬀ to meet. That standard requires a showing that the drug could not help any
class of patients for the design to be considered defective.21Therefore, if any group of patients is helped more
than that class is hurt by the drug, the detrimental eﬀects on other classes of patients are not enough to
establish liability since the doctor is presumed to know which classes of patients can be helped. The reason
for such a tough standard here is that society does not want liability potential to keep helpful drugs oﬀ the
market.22
17See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 6 (1997 Main Volume).
18Id.
19See id. at § 6(a) (stating that “a manufacturer of a prescription drug....who sells or otherwise distributes a defective
drug....is subject to liability for harm to persons caused by the defect”).
20See id. at § 6(b) (stating that “a prescription drug....is defective if at the time of sale or other distribution the drug....(1)
contains a manufacturing defect” or “(2) is not reasonably safe due to defective design”).
21See id. at § 6(c) (stating that “A prescription drug...is not reasonably safe due to defective design if the foreseeable risks
of harm posed by the drug....are suﬃciently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic beneﬁts that reasonable health-care
providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic beneﬁts, would not prescribe the drug...for any class of patients”).
22See id. at § 6 cmt. f. (stating that the tough standard for liability “shows appropriate deference to the regulated market,
where the FDA and learned intermediaries select which drugs should be available to the public generally and which drugs should
be given to individual patients, respectively. It does not, on the other hand, wholly exempt defendants from liability”).
8Given that the standard for establishing a defective product is so diﬃcult to reach, it should not be surprising
that the most common and potentially the most successful type of action against the SSRI manufacturers
is one that alleges a “failure to warn” by the manufacturer.23The Restatement lists the failure to warn and
instruct as the only other, in addition to the claims for defective design and manufacture, basis for asserting
liability against prescription drug makers.24For liability to attach to the manufacturers, the risk of harm
must have been reasonably foreseeable at the time of sale.25The manufacturer cannot avoid this standard
of reasonable foreseeability by ignoring what could potentially be a risk. In fact, the “manufacturers have
the responsibility to perform reasonable testing prior to marketing a product and to discover risks and risk-
avoidance measures that such testing would reveal.”26As a result of this duty to test the product, the claims
against SSRI manufacturers often are stated in two parts, seeking liability for a failure to warn and for a
failure to further test the drug.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts describes the conditions for holding a manufacturer liable due to a failure
to warn or instruct about the product’s use and eﬀects.27That description, which very closely mimics both
case law and scholarly interpretation of the subject, is as follows:
“§6(d): A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to inadequate
instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of
harm are provided to:
(1): prescribing and other health-care providers who are in a position to
reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings;
or
23See id. at § 6 cmt. d. (stating that “Failure to instruct or warn is the major basis of liability for manufacturers of
prescription drugs”).
24See id. at § 6(b) (listing the liability claims against prescription drug makers).
25See id. at § 6 cmt. g.
26Id.
27See id. at § 6(d).
9(2): the patient when the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that
health-care providers will not be in a position to reduce the risks of harm
in accordance with the instructions or warnings.”
§6(d)(1), therefore, requires the manufacturer to give reasonable instructions and warnings only to the
prescribing physicians. This is the deﬁned form of what is known as the learned intermediary doctrine,
which has been used to shield manufacturers from liability by assuming that doctors will use reasonable
instructions and warnings in their best professional judgment to best serve their patients.28,29
In practice, the learned intermediary doctrine has often been used to excuse the manufacturer from giving
any direct warning to the ultimate consumers of drugs. The reasoning behind the traditional rule that
consumers do not have to be informed in the same way as doctors was that consumers, who are assumed to
have no medical training or expertise, are in no position to evaluate warnings in a reasonable and independent
fashion that will best beneﬁt their own medical condition.30 §6(d)(2), on the other hand, is rooted in recent
cases and changes in the industry and leaves the door open for a duty to warn and inform the end user.
The gist of §6(d)(2) is the creation of a duty to warn the consumer in cases where providing a warning only
to the doctor will not reduce the set of risks to the consumer as a result of the warnings and instructions
provided to the doctor.31 §6(d)(2), by opening the door for a duty to warn the consumer, suggests an
28See id. at § 6 cmt. d. (stating that “warnings of unavoidable risks allow the health-care provider, and thereby the patient,
to make an informed choice whether to utilize the drug”).
29Ellen Relkin, Warnings in Pharmaceutical Cases: Is the Learned Intermediary Obsolete in the New Milennium?, in Ass’n
of Trial Lawyers of America Annual Convention Reference Materials Volume 2: Section on Toxic, Environmental
and Pharmaceutical Torts (July, 2000), available in Ann.2000 ATLA-CLE 2713 (stating that “virtually all jurisdictions
recognize some variant of the learned intermediary defense in the context of a prescription drug case”).
30See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 6 cmt. b. (1997 Main Volume) (stating that “The rationale
supporting this “learned intermediary” rule is that only health-care professionals are in a position to understand the signiﬁcance
of the risks involved and to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of a given form of prescription-based therapy”).
31See id. at cmt. e. (stating that “Subsection (d)(2) recognizes that direct warnings and instructions to patients are
warranted for drugs that are dispensed or administered to patients without the personal intervention or evaluation of a health-
10erosion of any rigid interpretation of the learned intermediary doctrine. The exact status of that doctrine
has received substantial attention in recent years. It is crucial to examine the recent transformation of the
learned intermediary doctrine, as this history has been the catalyst that has led to the suggestion of a duty
to warn the consumer in the Restatement.
C. Learned Intermediary Doctrine Analysis
As noted above, §6(d)(2) of the Restatement opens the door to a duty to warn more than just the doctor.
Comment b of that section of the Restatement sheds some light on the reasoning behind this expansion. Com-
ment b states that “in certain limited therapeutic relationships the physician or other health-care provider
has a much-diminished role as an evaluator or decision-maker. In these instances it may be appropriate to
impose on the manufacturer the duty to warn the patient directly.”32This comment recognizes what is in fact
a reality in today’s medical care. It is common for physicians to prescribe certain drugs without a thorough
evaluation or even an actual visit by the patient.33With such a low level of interaction between the patient
and the doctor, it is not realistic to think that the doctor is ﬁlling the role that the legal system was set up
to assume. Thus, there appear to be at least two easily implementable options.
The ﬁrst is a heightened set of prescribing restrictions for doctors. Doctors would loathe this option due to
care provider”).
32Id. at cmt. b.
33Janet L. Holt, Douments from Paxil Case May Aid Plaintiﬀs Harmed by Antidepressants, Trial, September, 2001, at 84,
86 (quoting attorney George “Skip” Murgatroyd as saying that “General practitioners prescribe these drugs with no psychiatric
evaluations. Sometimes they’re even giving out samples. They are just not aware of the dangers”).
11concerns over their autonomy and their ability to have a proﬁtable practice. This option also may also not
be practical today, given that there is less doctor-patient communication than in the past, a situation that
has become somewhat necessitated by the ﬁnancial restrictions of managed health-care.
The second option is for a requirement to warn consumers directly, rather than only the doctors, about
the negative aspects of taking the drug. This would allow informed choices by the consumer and at least
come closer to providing the protection to the consumer that was originally though to be adequate under the
learned intermediary doctrine. Yvonne Bukstein advanced a form of this option in a University of Pittsburgh
Law Review comment in Fall, 1987.34Her article focused on the shortcomings of the learned intermediary
doctrine, and suggested that the manufacturers should be forced to provide a package insert that would be
passed to each prescription drug consumer by the pharmacist.35This would further educate the patient, and
the doctor’s role would only change to the extent that the patient would want to further inquire about the
risks of the product.36
As noted above, the reduced role by doctors in the prescription process as compared to the traditional notion
of the doctor’s role is one of the primary reasons advanced by advocates who suggest a need for a duty to
warn consumers directly. One of the primary factors that has caused this reduction in the role of the doctor
as advisor is the proliferation of direct to consumer advertising.37The contention by those who seek to expand
the duty to warn is that advertising transforms the consumer from an unknowing passive party to one who
actually comes to the doctor requesting (or demanding) a particular drug.38
34Yvonne Bukstein, Comment, Drug Products Liability: Duty to Warn, 49 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 283 (1987).
35See id. at 303.
36See id. at 304.
37See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 6 cmt. e. (1997 Main Volume) (noting that direct to
consumer advertising, along with mass dispersion of a medication and speciﬁc FDA requirements for package inserts with a
drug, are factors that are most likely to require a warning to go directly to the consumer).
38Philip R. Alper, M.D., No: “Direct-to-Consumer” Advertising of Prescription Drugs Is More Harmful Than Helpful to Con-
sumers, (Nov. 25, 1999) <> (stating that “Patients have made appointments with me (I am a practicing internist) to ask about drugs they heard about through mass-media ads – for example, the allergy medication that sounds like a good idea and a cholesterol-lowering product with a pitch so persuasive that not taking the drug can appear dangerous. Some of these patients have requested drugs used only for conditions they didn’t have!”).This
newly educated consumer puts the doctor in a diﬃcult position. As Dr. Alper puts it, “giving a patient a prescription for
a medically inappropriate or relatively non-cost-eﬀective drug he or she has requested is often much easier – and is always
faster – than refusing with an explanation.”39And if the doctor does refuse to write the prescription, the patient may move to
12While it may still be assumed that no doctor will prescribe medication that has no reasonable relationship
to some apparent condition of the patient, there is worry, as Dr. Alper suggested, that doctors will prescribe
the drug speciﬁcally requested by a patient in cases where that drug is in some range of prescribable drugs.
The problem is that the requested drug, although one of the possible options, would sometimes not be the
best option in the doctor’s expert opinion if that doctor had the option to choose independently of the
patient the course of treatment thought best by the doctor.
Along the same line of worry is that a patient may believe that they are suﬀering from some malaise they
have heard about on a television commercial.41Where this is the case, the doctor is likely to diagnose the
condition suggested by the patient wherever it is reasonable, rather than simply starting from scratch and
making a diagnosis independent of what the layman patient believes he has. Although the patient in this
case may not request a speciﬁc drug, the advertising has suggested to the patient the prospect of having
some condition for which that manufacturer’s drug is intended to help.
Since the doctor’s judgment and independence is compromised in each of these situations, the argument is
that the consumer should be warned directly by the manufacturer of all eﬀects of the drug to assure that
the decision they are now making in tandem with the doctor is an informed decision.42
another doctor who will write the patient’s preferential prescription, thus causing the ﬁrst doctor to lose the patient and the
related revenue.40
41See id. at 779 n.260 (citing Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising and the Learned
Intermediary Rule, 46 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 829, 843-44 (1991)).
42See Perez v. Wyeth Lab., 161 N.J. 1 (1999) for an example of the duty to warn extending to patients based on extensive
direct to consumer advertising of the product by the drug maker. See also Amy D. White, Note, The Mass Marketing of
Prescription Drugs and Its Eﬀect on the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 25 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 745, 748 n.16 (2000)
(quoting the plaintiﬀs’ attorney in Perez: “the decision marks the ﬁrst time a court has stated that a company that does direct
to consumer advertising has an obligation to warn the consumer”).
13D. FDA Approval and the Duty to Warn
Drug manufacturers have attempted to defend themselves by saying that their compliance with FDA labeling
requirements precludes them from any tort liability. Among the reasons put forth for this view by the drug
makers is that the FDA regulations are meant to be comprehensive in order to unnecessarily overdeter doctors
from prescribing what many believe to be a helpful form of medication. This defense has been attacked on
two fronts.
First, and most broadly, is the claim that the FDA merely sets a minimum labeling requirement, and that
state tort law can require more of the manufacturer. The court in Motus v. Pﬁzer, Inc.43addressed this claim
directly when Pﬁzer claimed preemption precluded state tort liability rules from holding Pﬁzer liable for not
giving more than the FDA required warning. The Motus court stated that “most courts have found that
FDA regulations as to design and warning standards are minimum standards which do not preempt state
law defective design and failure to warn claims.”44The court also uses the federal statute itself in support of
this proposition, citing 21 C.F.R. sec. 314.70(c)(2)(i) for the proposition that manufacturers are permitted
to strengthen warning labels without FDA advance permission.45 The second attack on this defense by the
drug manufacturers is based on a fraud theory.46Under this theory, the claim is that the company withheld
43127 F.Supp.2d 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
44Id. at 1092 (citing and quoting the following cases for the proposition that FDA requirements are minimum standards: Hill
v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 1989); Kociemba v. Searle & Co., 680 F.Supp. 1293, 1299 (D.Minn. 1988), citing
Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F.Supp. 1483 (D.Kan. 1987), Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981), and
Salmon v. Parke Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975); and Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F.Supp. 239, 247 (E.D. Pa.
1990).
45Id. at 1094.
46Ellen Relkin, Warnings in Pharmaceutical Cases: Is the Learned Intermediary Obsolete in the New Milennium?, in Ass’n
of Trial Lawyers of America Annual Convention Reference Materials Volume 2: Section on Toxic, Environmental
and Pharmaceutical Torts (July, 2000), available in Ann.2000 ATLA-CLE 2713 (suggesting the “fraud on the FDA theory”
14information from or provided false information to the FDA, and thus the FDA labeling requirements turned
out to be less stringent than they would have been if they had been presented with all of the relevant and
accurate information.47Dr. Breggin believes that there has been widespread fraud committed on the FDA.
He claims to have found, while assisting in discovery against Eli Lilly & Co. (“Eli Lilly”), evidence that
Eli Lilly had “systematically mislabeled many kinds of adverse reactions” of patients in order to misstate or
understate in its reports to the FDA the actual problems that were caused by Prozac.48
E. Substantive SSRI Analysis
Using the general liability standards for prescription drugs as a backdrop, I will now turn to the primary
focus of this paper, namely the application of these general rules to some of the speciﬁc issues involving
SSRIs. The ﬁrst area to be discussed is the liability of SSRI manufacturers where claimants assert that the
SSRI caused the user to become violent toward himself and/or others.
II. The Link Between SSRIs and Violent Behavior
A starting point for examining the violent and suicidal behavior alleged to be linked to taking SSRI medi-
cation is Dr. Breggin’s “The Anti-Depressant Fact Book”.49Since Dr. Breggin has worked on many of the
cases against the SSRI manufacturers as one of the primary scientiﬁc and medical advisors for the plaintiﬀs,
as one reason why a warning that was given by the manufacturer should be invalidated, given that the warning may have been
diﬀerent (or the drug not approved at all) if the FDA had received all of the relevant information).
47See Motus v. Pﬁzer, Inc., 127 F.Supp.2d 1085 at 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that “state suits may complement the
regulatory methods of promoting safety by directly ﬂushing out more information about the risks of drugs and indirectly encour-
aging manufacturers to make complete risk disclosures to the FDA.” The Pﬁzer argument that additional state requirements
would overdeter doctors from prescribing Zoloft was rejected based on a combination of this possibility for increased disclosure
and the fact that Pﬁzer presented no persuasive evidence that overdeterrence would result from a strengthened warning label).
48Peter R. Breggin, M.D., The Antidepressant Fact Book 6 (2001).
49Peter R. Breggin, M.D., The Antidepressant Fact Book (2001).
15his speciﬁc theories have been put forth in courts of law and thus are most relevant in addressing the alleged
link.50 The most important of his medical theories is that SSRIs can cause mania, akathisia, and depression,
which all then can result in a greater likelihood of violent or suicidal behavior in the patient.51He also alleges
that the FDA has not acted diligently to uncover the side eﬀects of drugs such as Prozac because they
are associated too closely with the drug companies to act independently in evaluating their products.52His
information comes primarily from various scientiﬁc studies, as well as inside information he has obtained
through the discovery process as a result of working for the plaintiﬀs in cases against manufacturers.
A. Did the Manufacturers Hide Scientiﬁc Information from U.S. Regulators?
Dr. Breggin states that Dr. Richard Kapit, who was the chief medical oﬃcer in the Prozac approval process
for the FDA,53found some disturbing evidence of eﬀects of Prozac that were never given proper weight by
the FDA. In his “Safety Review” in 1986, Dr. Kapit warned that Prozac could actually worsen the condition
of some depressed patients.54At that time, he suggested that Prozac be labeled to warn doctors of this
potential eﬀect.55While the FDA did not act on this suggestion, it is notable that the labels for Prozac
in Germany, France, and Great Britain all warn that stimulatory eﬀects of Prozac could in fact lead to
suicide.56Although the United States approved Prozac without mentioning the link to suicide, they have
since required the manufacturer to mention the existence of a link to suicide “without conﬁrming that it was
50Craig Oﬀman, Prozac indignation: How a little-known Harvard clinician needled sleeping giant Eli Lilly, (May 17, 2000)
<www.salon.com/health/feature/2000/05/17/backlash/>.
51See Peter R. Breggin, M.D., The Antidepressant Fact Book (2001).




56See id. at 80.
16a proven adverse reaction”.57 One general explanation for the alleged violent eﬀect of SSRIs, in simpliﬁed
terms, is that SSRIs can work as powerful stimulants.58The stimulation of depressed minds, as the theory
goes, more likely leads to impulsive behavior that the depressed patient would not otherwise have the energy
or motivation to carry out without the added stimulation.
B. Akathisia
A more speciﬁc explanation of the alleged link between SSRIs and violent behavior is that Prozac and the
other SSRIs are thought by some to cause akathisia, which is a neurological stimulation and agitation of such
serious proportions that it can cause violence, suicide, and depression.59According to Dr. Breggin, “akathisia
is like being tortured from within. It’s like the screeching of chalk down a board, only it’s going down your
spinal column.”60 The drug companies, who are aware of the extreme nature of akathisia, argue generally
that their products do not cause akathisia.61As a secondary argument, the drug companies have argued at
trial that even if akathisia can be caused by the SSRIs, that does not mean that the particular individual at
the center of the particular controversy was actually suﬀering from akathisia at the time he committed the
act.62
57Id.
58See id. at 46, (noting that all of the SSRIs can cause stimulation, although concededly not to the same extent. Dr. Breggin
also states that they can each yield sedative eﬀects. These opposite eﬀects, according to Dr. Breggin, are further showing of
the lack of understanding of how the brain reacts to these drugs).
59See id. at 87 (citing the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV
(1994), which states that “Akathisia may be associated with dysphoria (painful emotions), irritability, aggression, or suicide
attempts”).
60Rob Waters, My antidepressant made me do it!, (July 19, 1999) <http://www.salon.com/health/feature/1999/07/19/zoloft/print.html>.
61See Christa Zevitas, New Prozac Patent Could Change the Tide of Litigation, (visited Feb. 22, 2002)
<http://www.lawyersweekly.com/prozac.cfm>.
62See id. (quoting Andy Vickery, who stated that Eli Lilly “argued that even if Prozac causes akathisia, Forsyth still did not
suﬀer from it. They (Eli Lilly) contended that akathisia is characterized by both an outer and an inner restlessness, and that
he didn’t have akathisia because he didn’t display any outward signs of restlessness”).
17C. Mania
A ﬁnal and related piece of the scientiﬁc explanation for the violent behavior of some patients taking antide-
pressants is that the drugs are known to cause mania. The American Psychiatric Association’s “Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, IV (1994)”, states that mania is associated with violence and
other criminal acts.63That manual also states that mania may be caused or incited by antidepressant medi-
cation.64This APA manual “is the oﬃcial source for diagnosis in psychiatry. It is used in most research, in
the FDA approval process, and by insurance carriers.”65While the labels for the antidepressants note that
the drugs may lead to mania and other similar eﬀects, there is no mention of any causal link between the
drugs and violence.66That is left for doctors to determine, and often the doctors are not informed to the
extent that they will conclude that the dangerous combination of a depressed person and the agitating eﬀects
of antidepressants may result in violent or suicidal actions by the patient.
The scientiﬁc evidence that has accumulated involving Prozac and other SSRIs’ tendencies to cause worsening
conditions and violent behavior may result in liability to the manufacturer in a variety of ways. The most
notable is the above-described duty to warn. While the manufacturers may have met the standards of the
FDA, that may not be enough. The FDA may have required too little information on the label due to
failure of the companies to fully disclose what they had learned about the links between SSRIs and violence.
Furthermore, even if they acted based on full and complete information, the FDA may have required less
stringent labeling than needed for the manufacturers to avoid state liability laws.
63See Peter R. Breggin, M.D., The Antidepressant Fact Book 101 (2001).
64See id. at 45 (citing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (1994), which states that “Symptoms
like those seen in a Manic Episode may also be precipitated by antidepressant treatment such as medication”).
65Id. at 102.
66Peter R. Breggin, M.D., GSK Updates the Paxil Label, (viewed Feb. 24, 2002)
<http://www.breggin.com/paxilwithdrawalsuit.html>.
18D. Eli Lilly, Prozac, and Joseph Wesbecker
Any examination of the viability of lawsuits alleging a causal relationship between SSRIs and violent behavior
must begin with the tragic story of Joseph Wesbecker. On September 14, 1989, Mr. Wesbecker entered the
Louisville newspaper printing facility where he had once worked and killed eight people and wounded twelve
others before killing himself.67Mr. Wesbecker had been taking Prozac for just less than a month prior to
committing these acts.68Soon thereafter, a wave of lawsuits was brought against Eli Lilly, the manufacturer
of Prozac.69These lawsuits alleged that Prozac had caused Mr. Wesbecker’s violent behavior, and that Eli
Lilly should pay for the wrongful deaths.70Of all of the plaintiﬀs similarly situated in the early 1990s, only
one suit actually went to trial. Several plaintiﬀs71in the Wesbecker matter combined their complaints and
went to trial against Eli Lilly in the case of Fentress v. Eli Lilly & Co.72
67See Potter v. Eli Lilly & Co., 926 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Ky. 1996).
68See J. Stratton Shartel, Decision to Eschew High-Tech Approach Pays Oﬀ in Prozac Case, Inside Litigation, Feb. 1995,
at 1, 2 (stating that the plaintiﬀs’ attorneys charged that Wesbecker began taking Prozac on August 17, 1989).
69See Christa Zevitas, New Prozac Patent Could Change the Tide of Litigation, (visited Feb. 22, 2002)
<http://www.lawyersweekly.com/prozac.cfm>. (stating that Eli Lilly & Co. was the target of more than 200 suits in the
mid-1990s alleging that Prozac caused violent and suicidal feeling in some users).
70See J. Stratton Shartel, Decision to Eschew High-Tech Approach Pays Oﬀ in Prozac Case, Inside Litigation, Feb. 1995,
at 1, 2.
71See Christa Zevitas, New Prozac Patent Could Change the Tide of Litigation, (visited Feb. 22, 2002)
http://www.lawyersweekly.com/prozac.cfm (stating that the case “was ﬁled on behalf of 28 victims of Joseph Wesbecker”).
72See J. Stratton Shartel, Decision to Eschew High-Tech Approach Pays Oﬀ in Prozac Case, Inside Litigation, Feb. 1995,
at 1, 2 (citing this unpublished case as follows: Fentress v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 90 CI 033, Jeﬀerson County Circuit Court,
Louisville, KY., Judge John W. Potter. Case ﬁled July 1990; verdict rendered December 12, 1994).
19Although proving the scientiﬁc basis of a general link between Prozac use and
violent or suicidal behavior was a signiﬁcant obstacle faced by the plaintiﬀs in the
Wesbecker cases, it was not the only or perhaps even the primary diﬃculty faced
by the plaintiﬀs in this case. The additional problem was showing that Prozac
actually caused Wesbecker individually to commit these acts. Since many Prozac
users, including Wesbecker himself, suﬀer from severe depression, it is extremely
diﬃcult to convince a jury that the drug, rather than the underlying condition
that led to the prescription of the drug, was the cause of the violent outburst.
Joseph Wesbecker had been struggling with mental health problems for some time before his shooting
rampage.73In addition, one of the more damaging pieces of evidence to the plaintiﬀs’ case showed that
he had made threats to commit violent acts against others at his workplace before he ever started taking
Prozac.74These threats were considered serious, as Wesbecker had even been known to once bring a loaded
gun to work.75He had attempted to commit suicide at least twelve times.76Further weighing against the case
that Prozac had caused Wesbecker’s violence was that he had been accumulating a stockpile of guns for
several months prior to the shooting.77
73See id. at 1 (stating that the evidence “revealed that Wesbecker had a history of mental instability”). See also Anthony
Daniels, Books: Did Prozac pull the trigger? Anthony Daniels considers a case of mass murder, drugs and litigation, The
Sunday London Telegraph, Sept. 8, 1996, at 15 <http://www.oralchelation.net/data/Lilly/data6.htm> (quoting John
Cornwell from his book The Power to Harm: Mind, Medicine and Murder on Trial: “for ﬁve years psychiatrists had treated
his manic-depressive and schizoaﬀective disorders with more than a dozen psychoactive medications”).
74See J. Stratton Shartel, Decision to Eschew High-Tech Approach Pays Oﬀ in Prozac Case, Inside Litigation, Feb. 1995,
at 1, 2 (stating that Wesbecker had “regularly talked about killing his bosses”).
75See id. at Figure 1 (presenting a timeline used by defense counsel in the case to show that Wesbecker had a history of
violent actions and threats. Included in that timeline is an incident in which Wesbecker once brought a loaded gun to work
and told a co-worker that he was going to kill their foreman).
76See id. at 1.
77See id.
20Although Wesbecker had demonstrated violent tendencies, the plaintiﬀs emphasized that he had not acted
on them until after he had begun taking Prozac (which, as noted above, was about a month before the fatal
shootings).78The defense, in response, emphasized the fact that there had been intervening circumstances
since he had begun taking Prozac that were more likely to have caused his action than the drug. One
important change was that Wesbecker had been informed that his disability payments from Standard Gravure
would be reduced from $1,400 per month to $300 per month eﬀective October 1, 1989 due to the fact that
the company did not regard mental illness as a handicap.79Additionally, Wesbecker’s grandmother, who
apparently was his closest and most loved family member, had died about a month before the shooting.80
One ﬁnal strategy used by the defense in the Wesbecker trial was demonstration of Wesbecker as a man
whose violent manner spread to all parts of his life. They introduced his ex-wife as a witness. Not only did
the ex-wife talk about Wesbecker’s repeated threats against his bosses, but she also testiﬁed that he had
once threatened to kill her eleven year-old daughter.81 All of these factors appeared to sway the jury,
as the 9-3 decision82was handed down with the result that Eli Lilly was not responsible for Wesbecker’s
78See id. at 2 (stating that the plaintiﬀs alleged that Wesbecker had begun taking Prozac on August 17, 1989, and that the
Prozac directly caused the shootings that occurred on September 14, 1989). See also Anthony Daniels, Books: Did Prozac pull
the trigger? Anthony Daniels considers a case of mass murder, drugs and litigation, The Sunday London Telegraph, Sept.
8, 1996, at 15 <http://www.oralchelation.net/data/Lilly/data6.htm> (citing John Cornwell from his book The Power to
Harm: Mind, Medicine and Murder on Trial for the proposition that Wesbecker had been prescribed Prozac about a year before
the shootings, but stopped taking it after two days because he did not like the eﬀects of the drug. Wesbecker’s psychiatrist tried
Prozac again in August of 1989. Just two days before the shootings (Three days according to Dr. Breggin’s Anti-Depressant
Fact Book at 174, which otherwise aﬃrms Cornwell’s account of these events), the psychiatrist stated that he was disturbed by
the agitation and volatile moods Prozac seemed to produce in Wesbecker. That psychiatrist did not discontinue the Prozac,
however, as Wesbecker “insisted that it helped him”).
79See J. Stratton Shartel, Decision to Eschew High-Tech Approach Pays Oﬀ in Prozac Case, Inside Litigation, Feb. 1995,
at 1, 3.
80See id.
81See id. at Figure 1 (quoting the statement of Wesbecker’s ex-wife, Brenda Camp, who said that Wesbecker had told her
“You know, it would be easy for me to blow your daughter’s brains out, and then I wouldn’t have to look at her. I wouldn’t
have to see her and I wouldn’t have to be jealous of yours and her relationship”).
82See Peter R. Breggin, M.D., The Antidepressant Fact Book 177 (2001) (noting that an 8-4 vote would have resulted in
a hung jury, which in Dr. Breggin’s words would have created a “public relations nightmare for Prozac”).
21behavior.83Because of the intense media publicity surrounding the trial, the verdict oﬀered Eli Lilly a very
valuable public conﬁrmation of the safety of their primary product.84Several other suits were undoubtedly
settled or not brought at all on the basis of this result.85Also, the verdict helped users and potential users
of the drug feel comfortable with the safety of Prozac. Thus, the decision was a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial windfall
for Eli Lilly, for whom Prozac was at one time one of the world’s top selling drugs.86 Although all of the
evidence presented by the defense concerning Wesbecker’s past behavior seemed to outweigh the scientiﬁc
evidence brought by the plaintiﬀs, it soon was discovered that there may have been less than a full and
complete presentation of evidence at the trial. During the latter stages of the trial, the parties argued at
length to the judge concerning the admissibility of evidence that Eli Lilly had previously withheld information
from the FDA concerning an unrelated drug. The plaintiﬀs sought to use this to show the jury that Eli
Lilly had a pattern of revealing only the information it needed to get its drugs approved and to reap the
proﬁts from them, regardless of the safety. Judge Potter, who presided over the case, ruled for the plaintiﬀs
on the matter. The plaintiﬀs, however, wrapped up their case the day after winning this motion without
any mention of this evidence that they had fought so hard to be able to introduce to the jury.87 Judge
83See Christa Zevitas, New Prozac Patent Could Change the Tide of Litigation, (visited Feb. 22, 2002)
<http://www.lawyersweekly.com/prozac.cfm>.
84See May L. Harris, Problems with Prozac: A Defective Product Responsible for Criminal Behavior?, 10 J. Contemp.
Legal Issues 359, 368 (1999) (quoting Eli Lilly CEO Randall Tobias following the Fentress verdict: “We have proven in a
court of law, just as we have to more than seventy scientiﬁc and regulatory bodies all over the world, that Prozac is safe and
eﬀective. Our hearts go out to the victims of the terrible tragedy. But the members of the jury, after hearing the scientiﬁc and
medical facts...came to the only logical conclusion – that Prozac had nothing to do with Joseph Wesbecker’s actions”).
85See Christa Zevitas, New Prozac Patent Could Change the Tide of Litigation, (visited Feb. 22, 2002)
<http://www.lawyersweekly.com/prozac.cfm> (citing an April 22, 2000 article from the Indianapolis Star as stating that
the Fentress verdict “prompted many plaintiﬀs’ attorneys to drop their Prozac cases”).
86See Lawrence Mondi, Did Prozac Make Him Do It?, Time, (Nov. 28, 1994)
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/archive/1994/941128/941128/behavior.box.html (stating that Prozac is the
“most widely prescribed antidepressant.” See also Anthony Daniels, Books: Did Prozac pull the trigger? Anthony
Daniels considers a case of mass murder, drugs and litigation, The Sunday London Telegraph, Sept. 8, 1996, at 15
<http://www.oralchelation.net/data/Lilly/data6.htm> (citing John Cornwell from his book The Power to Harm: Mind,
Medicine and Murder on Trial as stating that Prozac contributed “more than one-fourth of Eli Lilly and Co.’s total 1995 sales
of $6.5 billion”).
87See Potter v. Eli Lilly & Co., 926 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Ky. 1996) (stating that plaintiﬀs had sought to allow introduction
of evidence that Eli Lilly had been charged criminally for failing to report deaths from the use of Oraﬂex, another drug
22Potter then suspected the possibility of a secret settlement, which both parties denied when Judge Potter
took them aside to inquire about this strange turn of events.88The case was soon thereafter sent to the jury,
which returned to the court a decision against the plaintiﬀs. Following the expiration of the time limitation
for appeals to be ﬁled, Judge Potter ﬁled his own motion to hold a formal hearing with the parties to ﬁnd
why the ﬁnal reported verdict should not be changed from “dismissed with prejudice” to “dismissed with
prejudice as settled” based on his belief that the evidence indicated that a settlement had actually been
reached in this case.89Both parties to the Fentress case appealed this action by Judge Potter,90and although
the Court of Appeals determined that Judge Potter could not make such a change absent fraud by the
parties,91that determination was reversed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky, who ultimately agreed with
Judge Potter and upheld the validity of his decision.92Finally, Judge Potter’s suspicions resulted in an oﬃcial
change of the verdict in 1997 to “dismissed as settled.”93 Despite the fact that Judge Potter had found
that the trial had been less than zealously litigated, the media attention had long since moved away from
this matter, and as such the new verdict was not publicized in nearly the same magnitude as the original
verdict.94Eli Lilly had eﬀectively paid for a jury verdict to establish precedent in favor of Prozac. While the
manufactured by Eli Lilly, to the FDA. The court stated that this issue was “extensively argued” and that “the adversarial
encounter took more than a day from the trial”).
88See id. at 452.
89See id. at 451 (providing the following timeline for the course of events: Jury verdict reached on December 12, 1994; Judge
Potter enters the judgment on January 25, 1995; Appeal time expired on February 24, 1995; Judge Potter ﬁles motion seeking
to amend the verdict on April 19, 1995).
90See id. at 452.
91See id.
92See id. at 455.
93Christa Zevitas, New Prozac Patent Could Change the Tide of Litigation, (visited Feb. 22, 2002)
<http://www.lawyersweekly.com/prozac.cfm>.
94See Peter R. Breggin, M.D., The Antidepressant Fact Book 178 (2001) (stating that “Although the mass media had
covered the original fake victory by Eli Lilly & Co., only the British news agency, Reuters, made any mention of the reversal
against the drug company”).
23precedent does not stand, the public impression of the safety of Prozac that was created by the widespread
publicity of the ﬁrst Wesbecker verdict remains.
Following the original December 1994 Fentress verdict, all of the suits against Eli Lilly and the other SSRI
manufacturers were dismissed or settled.95The reasons for this high rate of settlement are fairly easy to
ascertain. Understandably, the drug makers do not enjoy the prospect of the great amount of negative
publicity a trial might bring. Additionally, it is always diﬃcult to successfully defend claims when the
plaintiﬀs have such strong sympathy in their favor due to there being actual wounded victims or family
members of dead victims. These factors, combined with the fact that the plaintiﬀs’ medical evidence is at
least somewhat compelling, makes it much less risky for the drug makers to settle the cases quietly. Recent
years, however, have seen a return to the courtroom, with juries reaching decisions on two matters contesting
substantially the same issue as in the Wesbecker case.
E. The Forsyth Case and the Sepracor Patent
The ﬁrst notable return to the courtroom again featured Eli Lilly as the defendant and Prozac as the alleged
“culprit”. Forsyth v. Eli Lilly, as with virtually all of the cases brought against the antidepressant drug
manufacturers, tells a gruesome tale of violence. In this case, William Forsyth stabbed his wife ﬁfteen times in
their bedroom before impaling himself on another knife.96Their children brought wrongful death suits against
Eli Lilly.97 As with the Wesbecker case, the Forsyth case defendants argued that the events in Forsyth’s
life caused him to act violently rather than his prescription of Prozac. The Eli Lilly attorneys painted
him as a man who was suﬀering from major depression and whose marriage was failing. This extremely
95See Christa Zevitas, New Prozac Patent Could Change the Tide of Litigation, (visited Feb. 22, 2002)
<http://www.lawyersweekly.com/prozac.cfm> (stating that only two cases regarding Prozac have made it to trial. Those
cases are the Fentress case involving the Joseph Wesbecker shootings and the case of Forsyth v. Eli Lilly & Co.).
96See May L. Harris, Problems with Prozac: A Defective Product Responsible for Criminal Behavior?, 10 J. Contemp.
Legal Issues 359 (1999).
97See id.
24traumatic life event was the cause of his actions, according to the defense, just as similar circumstances
result in violent behavior each year with those who are not using SSRIs.98 The plaintiﬀs, on the other
hand, emphasized that three physicians had examined Forsyth in the months before his violent episode,
with each of them failing to detect any suicidal thoughts.99They tried to paint the introduction of Prozac,
which Forsyth began taking ten days before the murder-suicide, as the catalyst for his shocking behavior.100
On April 7, 1999, the Hawaii jury in Forsyth ruled unanimously for Eli Lilly, ﬁnding that Prozac was not
the cause of Forsyth’s actions.101Unlike in Fentress, Eli Lilly actually obtained a valid precedent, as there
was no allegation of hidden settlement (although the plaintiﬀs ﬁled an appeal based on the fact that three
jurors later said that they disagreed with the verdict102). As with Fentress, however, controversy has arisen
following this decision that has cast doubt on the status of the outcome.
Due to the nearing expiration of the Prozac patent, Eli Lilly had been working to introduce a “new Prozac”.
The new version was to come from another drug manufacturer named Sepracor, who had developed a
supposed improved version of Prozac. Eli Lilly acquired exclusive rights to patent 5,708,035 from Sepracor
in December 1998 by paying Sepracor $20 million, along with another $70 million in milestone payments
based on the drug’s progress through clinical trials and a percentage of sales103 (Eli Lilly subsequently
terminated the licensing and development agreement with Sepracor, apparently due to heart irregularities
98See id. at 359-60 (quoting Eli Lilly attorney Andrew See: “This case is about a good drug and a very bad, powerful
disease”).
99See id. at 360.
100See id. at 359 (quoting plaintiﬀs’ attorney Andy Vickery: “This is a case about drug-induced violence. Bill was taking
Prozac for ten days and did something totally out of character”).
101See Vickery & Waldner, press release, Suit Alleges Second Prozac Verdict Also Tainted, (June 8, 2000)
<www.justiceseekers.com>. Vickery & Waldner represented the plaintiﬀs in Forsyth v. Eli Lilly.
102See id.
103See Mitchell Zuckoﬀ, Prozac data was kept from trial, suit says, Boston Globe, (June 8, 2000)
<http://www.connix.com/∼narpa/prozac.data.suppressed.htm>.
25found in association with high dosages of the drug in clinical testing, in October 2000).104 It is notable that
Eli Lilly purchased the rights to this patent from Sepracor months before the beginning of arguments in the
Forsyth v. Eli Lilly case.105
The signiﬁcance of this newly acquired patent is that the language used in the patent ﬁling by Sepra-
cor to describe the new drug indicates that the eﬀects of Prozac that Eli Lilly had always denied may in
fact have been known to exist. The Sepracor patent lists among the advantages of the new drug as com-
pared to the old Prozac that the new Prozac will decrease existing side eﬀects, including “inner restlessness
(akathisia)”.106This was obviously an important revelation for the plaintiﬀs in cases against Eli Lilly, as one
of the centerpieces of their legal argument was that Prozac caused akathisia, which in turn caused violent
behavior.107 The information about the new Prozac patent wording did not come to the attention of the
plaintiﬀs until more than a year after the verdict was rendered in Forsyth, when a Boston Globe article
revealed the incriminating wording of the new patent.108As a result of this discovery, the plaintiﬀs’ lawyers
in the Forsyth case have ﬁled an appeal seeking a new trial based upon what they called fraud by the defense
attorneys.109They allege that the in-house attorneys for Eli Lilly, including a patent attorney named Doug
104See Sepracor falls on Lilly’s decision to drop Prozac, Boston Business Journal, (October 19, 2000)
http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2000/10/16/daily10.html.
105See Forsyth v. Eli Lilly & Co., Case No. CV00-00401 SPK, Independent Action to Set Aside Judgment for Fraud on the
Court, paragraph 14, (June 7, 2000) <http://www.baumhedlundlaw.com/media/fraudcomplaint.html>. This fraud complaint
was obtained from the website of Baum, Hedlund, Aristei, Guilford & Schiavo, who is one of the ﬁrms representing the plaintiﬀs
in this matter.
106Id. at paragraph 20.
107See id. at paragraph 24 (describing that one of the speciﬁc points of contention at trial was whether akathisia could be
exhibited by mere inner restlessness or whether external manifestations were also necessary. Eli Lilly’s attorneys argued that
external manifestations were required, and that Forsyth had not exhibited such signs. The Sepracor patent’s description of
akathisia as “inner restlessness” without mention of any external signs was seen by the plantiﬀs’ lawyers as an admission by Eli
Lilly upon purchasing the Sepracor patent that inner restlessness was in fact the lone requirement for demonstrating akathisia).
108See id. at paragraph 30 (noting that a May 7, 2000 article in the Boston Globe entitled “Prozac Revisited” brought the
matter to their attention).
109Se id.
26Norman, would have known about the Sepracor patent language linking the old Prozac to akathisia and
suicidal thoughts.110Despite this knowledge, according to the complaint, they sat silently while the defense
argued that Prozac did not cause akathisia or suicidal thoughts.111According to the plaintiﬀs, 9th circuit
precedent112prohibits in-house lawyers, due to their role as “oﬃcers of the court”, to remain silent “while
trial counsel withholds critical evidence and creates erroneous impressions”.113 Regardless of the success
of the attempt to get a new trial in Forsyth, this Sepracor patent information will likely be used in future
suits against Eli Lilly. Andy Vickery, the most visible plaintiﬀs’ attorney in these matters, believes that
the new information will sway jurors to the plaintiﬀs’ position that the drug company knew the side eﬀects
existed, and thus should have warned of these eﬀects.114In addition, he feels that expert witnesses used
by the plaintiﬀs will have increased credibility as a result of the Sepracor patent disclosure.115 Another
attorney in the Forsyth case, Karen A. Barth, has said that she sees the purchase of the new patent as a
clear admission by Eli Lilly of their knowledge of the dangerous eﬀects of Prozac. “If Lilly denies this”, says
Barth, “they’ve paid $90 million for an invalid patent. (For a patent of a new product to be accepted, it
must be something new and useful. The “useful” part of this patent is reduced side eﬀects.)”116 While it is
110See id. at paragraphs 21, 25.
111See id. at paragraph 23 (alleging a lack of action by Mr. Norman and other trial counsel of Eli
Lilly). See also Mitchell Zuckoﬀ, Prozac data was kept from trial, suit says, Boston Globe, (June 8, 2000)
<http://www.connix.com/∼narpa/prozac.data.suppressed.htm> (noting that top Eli Lilly scientist Dr. Gary Tollefson tes-
tiﬁed at trial “that there is absolutely no medically sound evidence of an association between any antidepressant medicine,
including Prozac, and the induction of suicidal ideation or violence”).
112See Pumphrey v. K.W. Thompson Tool Co., 62 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1995).
113Vickery & Waldner, press release, Suit Alleges Second Prozac Verdict Also Tainted, (June 8, 2000)
<www.justiceseekers.com>.
114See Christa Zevitas, New Prozac Patent Could Change the Tide of Litigation, (visited Feb. 22, 2002)
<http://www.lawyersweekly.com/prozac.cfm>.
115See id.
116Baum, Hedlund, Aristei, Guilford & Downey, press release, Prozac Maker, Eli Lilly and Company, Committed
Fraud on Hawaii Court by Concealing Crucial Evidence at Trial, Family in Newly Filed Lawsuit Allege, (June 8, 2000)
<www.baumhedlundlaw.com/media/pressreleasefraud.html>.
27understandable that plaintiﬀs’ attorneys would trumpet the value of this information, it is notable that they
are not the only experts who feel the Sepracor patent is crucial. Author, psychiatrist, and Harvard Medical
School instructor Dr. Joseph Glenmullen, who has written about the dangers of Prozac in his controversial
book entitled “Prozac Backlash”, stated that “To me the new patent can be compared to the tobacco pa-
pers. It’s a pharmaceutical company document that acknowledges this dangerous side eﬀect which has been
downplayed by Eli Lilly and other pharmaceutical companies for a decade.”117 It is certainly not clear how
great of an impact this will have on suits against Eli Lilly, but it will provide plaintiﬀs at least a temporary
boost of energy in their zeal to ﬁght the drug maker. As usual, Eli Lilly will most likely continue to counter
by settling most suits and by using what has thus far been a successful defense that combines blaming the
actor’s underlying mental illness, pointing to intervening circumstances in the actor’s life, and relying on
FDA approval as an indication of the safety of their product. As to the speciﬁc allegations regarding the
Sepracor patent, Eli Lilly has responded by saying that Sepracor was an entirely separate company from Eli
Lilly and that Eli Lilly did not have to ﬁnd all of the side eﬀects listed in the Sepracor patent to be medically
or scientiﬁcally proven in order to ﬁnd value in other aspects of the new drug.118
F. The Tobin Case
Having reviewed the two cases against Eli Lilly that reached jury verdicts (albeit under strange circum-
stances), I will now turn to the most publicized recent case to reach a jury. The latest case is that of Tobin
v. SmithKline Beecham Pharmaceuticals, which is yet another horriﬁc tale in which the plaintiﬀs assert that
117Mitchell Zuckoﬀ, Prozac data was kept from trial, suit says, Boston Globe, (June 8, 2000)
<http://www.connix.com/∼narpa/prozac.data.suppressed.htm> (quoting Dr. Glenmullen).
118See Editorial, The prozac question, Boston Globe, June 13, 2000, at A26 (stating that “the patent’s message should also
be conveyed to a jury in a second trial of the...case”).
28an SSRI was the catalyst. The crime in this case occurred on February 13, 1998, when Donald Schell, a
Wyoming man, killed his wife, as well as his visiting daughter and nine-month-old granddaughter, before turn-
ing the gun on himself.119Schell had been taking Paxil for only two days before the murders120, and had taken
Prozac in the past (but stopped taking Prozac because of hallucinations caused by that drug).121Timothy
Tobin (Schell’s son-in-law), the husband and father, respectively, of the murdered daughter and granddaugh-
ter, brought the wrongful death suit along with the sister of Schell’s murdered wife, Neva Kay Hardy.122
While the arguments were essentially the same as in the Eli Lilly cases, Andy Vickery, who again was the
plaintiﬀs’ attorney, employed a somewhat diﬀerent approach in the Tobin case. This time, he made sure that
he “didn’t let the defense try the case on an either/or basis: Was it depression or was it Paxil?”123Instead,
he conceded that depression may be a risk factor for suicide and violent behavior, but asked the jury to
ﬁnd that Paxil “was a biological trigger that was a concurrent cause of the tragedy.”124 Another diﬀerence
between the Tobin case and the previous ones against Eli Lilly was that while there was some documentation
of Eli Lilly studies linking Prozac to suicide and violence, they may not have been as harmful to Eli Lilly
as the documents discovered by the plaintiﬀs pertaining to SmithKline Beecham (SmithKline Beecham is
now known as GlaxoSmithKline and will be referred to for the remainder of this paper as “SmithKline”
given that the new ownership of the company is irrelevant to the substance of this paper) and Paxil. The
plaintiﬀs in Tobin found internal company documents showing that company-requested studies had produced
119See Associated Press, Paxil Maker Ordered to Pay $8 Million, (June 6, 2001)
<http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/living/dailynews/paxil010606.html>.
120See Janet L. Holt, Douments from Paxil Case May Aid Plaintiﬀs Harmed by Antidepressants, Trial, September, 2001, at
84.
121See Associated Press, Paxil Maker Ordered to Pay $8 Million, (June 6, 2001)
<http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/living/dailynews/paxil010606.html> (citing Andy Vickery as source).
122See id.
123Janet L. Holt, Douments from Paxil Case May Aid Plaintiﬀs Harmed by Antidepressants, Trial, September, 2001, at 84.
124Id.
29evidence that hundreds of volunteers had adverse reactions to Paxil, including attempted suicide.125Vickery
said that his strategy in Tobin was to use this evidence to argue that the defendant should have known
of the risk, and therefore should have conducted clinical trials to further test for the possibility of a link
between Paxil and the adverse reactions reported among volunteers.126Not surprisingly, Vickery suggested
that the drug companies do such tests only to the extent necessary to get FDA approval and thus to make
the maximum proﬁts from the product without regard to ensuring maximum consumer safety.127 Although
Vickery’s change in strategy and the addition of more evidence of pre-existing knowledge of SmithKline may
have been the most tangible diﬀerences from the other cases, there were other signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the Potter and Forsyth cases and the Tobin case. The most notable diﬀerence may have been the human
element of the facts in the Tobin case. The defense strategy in the other cases had been, at least partially,
to claim that there were recent circumstances in the life of the killer that were more likely to have caused
the violent outburst than the antidepressant. Although Mr. Schell had been through the recent deaths of
his brother and father-in-law, and SmithKline tried to use these events as likely causes of Mr. Schell’s out-
burst128, those events seem less serious than the ones experienced in the Eli Lilly cases. Wesbecker had lost
his closest family member, and had reason to be angry with his workplace due to his reduction in beneﬁts.
Forsyth was said to have a failing marriage, which is often the cause of murder-suicides. But the problems
Mr. Schell was experiencing did not seem to ﬁt the crime he committed. There seemed to be no indication,
before he took Paxil, that this kind of behavior would occur. In fact, Timothy Tobin himself has stated
125See id. at 86.
126See id.
127See id. (quoting Andy Vickery as saying that “Drug companies test exhaustively for things they can market”, while noting
that they should be as diligent in testing for risks).
128See Associated Press, Paxil Maker Ordered to Pay $8 Million, (June 6, 2001)
<http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/living/dailynews/paxil010606.html> (stating that defense attorney Charles
Preuss cited the death of Schell’s father-in-law and brother, as well as problems at work regarding a threatened lawsuit, as
among the contributing factors to his violent outburst).
30that Mr. Schell was a caring, loving, and non-violent man and that the family was especially closely knit,
particularly after the birth of the granddaughter (the family’s ﬁrst grandchild).129While there can be no
certainty as to how signiﬁcant a role this played in the jury’s decision, the link between the killer’s life events
and the subsequent murders was far less apparent in this case than it had been in the two cases against Eli
Lilly.
On June 6, 2001, the jury in the Tobin case found SmithKline 80% liable for Schell’s actions130, holding that
“Paxil can cause some individuals to commit homicide and/or suicide”.131The court then awarded an $8
million judgment based on the decision of the jury.132Appeals by the defense are still pending, although the
U.S. District Court of Wyoming denied SmithKline’s request for judgment as a matter of law as well as its
request for a new trial.133 As expected, SmithKline did not believe the verdict was a true indication of the
safety of Paxil. SmithKline attorney Charles Preuss still held after the case that “Paxil is a very eﬀective
medication in helping depression, and our only regret is that Mr. Schell did not have Paxil for a longer pe-
riod of time.”134“It’s plain from the facts, science, and common sense,” Preuss said in his closing arguments,
“Don Schell’s escalating depression caused this.”135 SmithKline Senior Vice-President David Wheadon ap-
peared on the Today show following the Tobin decision, where he acknowledged that some patients have
129See Four people dead is four too many, The Guardian, (Aug. 9, 2001)
http://www.guardian.co.uk/health/story/0,3605,534058,00.html.
130See Associated Press, Paxil Maker Ordered to Pay $8 Million, (June 6, 2001)
<http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/living/dailynews/paxil010606.html> (noting that Donald Schell was found li-
able for 20% of the fault in the case).
131Tobin v. SmithKline Beecham Pharmaceuticals, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D. Wyo. 2001) (quoting the ﬁrst of the necessary
elements of proof given as jury instructions in the case).
132See Paxil’s maker hit with $8 million judgment, Houston Chronicle, (June 7, 2001) <http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA
/story.hts/nation/934893>.
133See Tobin v. SmithKline Beecham Pharmaceuticals, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D. Wyo. 2001).
134Paxil’s maker hit with $8 million judgment, Houston Chronicle, (June 7, 2001) <http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA
/story.hts/nation/934893>.
135Associated Press, Paxil Maker Ordered to Pay $8 Million, (June 6, 2001) <http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/living/dailynews/paxil010606.html>.
31acted violently after taking Paxil, but that scientiﬁc data has not shown Paxil to be the cause.136Vickery
countered, however, with what has always been his main contention. “Since 1990, SmithKline knew there
was a small group at risk, and Don Schell was one of those vulnerable people”, Vickery stated.137 So what
are the questions that should be raised or conclusions that should be drawn from these three cases? First,
it seems probable that the Tobin verdict will stimulate further suits against the drug makers. Since the
hundreds of suits that were ﬁled against Eli Lilly in the early 1990’s following Wesbecker’s shootings, the
amount of suits ﬁled have diminished substantially.138The new precedent established in Tobin may convince
more plaintiﬀs, and perhaps more importantly more plaintiﬀs’ attorneys, to take their shots against the big
pharmaceutical companies.139 A second notable point following these cases is that Eli Lilly still appears
to be untouchable. While their tactics have been questioned, the bottom line is that they have not had a
losing verdict. This is despite the fact that most of the cases ﬁled were against the maker of the popular
Prozac.140Although it is probably true that the right plaintiﬀ could score a victory against Eli Lilly, and
those plaintiﬀs have probably existed, Eli Lilly has managed to keep them from having their cases heard
before a jury. As such, Eli Lilly and Prozac appear to be likely, after more than ten years of cases alleging
a link between Prozac and violent behavior, to escape broad sanctions in this area absent some yet to be
136See Paxil’s maker hit with $8 million judgment, Houston Chronicle, (June 7, 2001) <http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA
/story.hts/nation/934893>.
137Associated Press, Paxil Maker Ordered to Pay $8 Million, (June 6, 2001) <http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/living/dailynews/paxil010606.html>.
138See Claudine Chamberlain, Prozac Prosecution Rests (visited Feb. 24, 2002)
<http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/living/InYourHead/allinyourhead 45.html> (quoting Andy Vickery, at some
date prior to the Tobin case: “With the exception of me, I don’t know anybody who’s taking on new cases against these drug
companies. It’s a monumental eﬀort”).
139See Janet L. Holt, Douments from Paxil Case May Aid Plaintiﬀs Harmed by Antidepressants, Trial, September, 2001, at
84 (citing Andy Vickery’s belief that the Tobin result will lead to more cases. Also quoting Los Angeles attorney George “Skip”
Murgatroyd: “the Tobin victory will make it easier for attorneys bringing antidepressant cases, primarily because company
documents showing that Paxil could cause serious side eﬀects were made public”).
140See Claudine Chamberlain, Prozac Prosecution Rests, (visited Feb. 24, 2002)
<http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/living/InYourHead/allinyourhead 45.html> (stating that “Eli Lilly alone has
faced more than 160 civil lawsuits blaming Prozac for violence”).
32found smoking gun (it has yet to be determined whether the Sepracor patent will be that smoking gun).
Another major question that arose following the Tobin verdict was the direct impact that decision would
have on future suits. Andy Vickery speculated about this potential, saying that collateral estoppel may al-
low courts to rule across the board against SmithKline on pending Paxil litigation of substantially the same
matter.141Vickery’s hope for a broad impact is based on the non-speciﬁc jury instruction in Tobin that Paxil
can cause some individuals to commit homicide and/or suicide.142Vickery got his chance to test out this
collateral estoppel theory in Coburn v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,143a Utah case. In that case, in which
a Paxil user had committed suicide, Vickery made a motion for partial summary judgment on the grounds
that collateral estoppel based on the result in Tobin rendered any argument in the case unnecessary.144 The
Coburn court rejected Vickery’s attempt at collateral estoppel rather forcefully, listing several reasons why
the Tobin verdict does not apply to Coburn.145Many of these reasons would also mandate that collateral
estoppel not apply to most other cases brought against SmithKline. The ﬁrst problem with collateral estop-
pel was one of “issue identity”, which is a problem with the fact that it is not clear what the basis for the
Tobin jury’s decision was.146The plaintiﬀs in Tobin oﬀered up several theories for recovery, and the jury was
not asked to specify under which of those theories it was deciding for the plaintiﬀ.147Instead, as noted above,
the jury only said that Paxil can cause some individuals to commit suicide and/or homicide.148 Another
141See Janet L. Holt, Douments from Paxil Case May Aid Plaintiﬀs Harmed by Antidepressants, Trial, September, 2001, at
84, 86.
142See id.





148See id. (making clear that the Tobin jury did not specify which theory of the plaintiﬀs it accepted in awarding them the
verdict. The factual diﬀerences between the cases make it necessary for a jury to determine whether Coburn was suﬀering from
any of the potential Paxil-related causes of violent or suicidal behavior).
33unidentiﬁed issue concerns the fact that only some people are vulnerable to the eﬀects that apparently both-
ered Schell. Since the population of people in that group is undeﬁned, the court refused to simply assume
that Mr. Coburn should be included in that group based on the fact that he committed suicide while taking
Paxil. Since there must be an examination of the speciﬁc facts of the case in order to determine whether Mr.
Coburn is in the vulnerable subpopulation, the court decided that a jury was in the best position to make
the determination.149 A ﬁnal ambiguity cited by the court was that the plaintiﬀ had not shown that Utah
applied the same tort liability standards as Wyoming.150Thus, even if the jury’s reasoning was known, it
would not be possible to use collateral estoppel unless the grounds for liability were the same in both states.
Yet another problem with applying collateral estoppel is that the standard for a violation of the duty to
warn is that the manufacturer knew or should have known about the fact for which a warning should have
been given.151In this case, Mr. Coburn was taking Paxil in November 1996.152This was prior to 1998, when
Schell shot his family and himself. Because of the earlier date, the court would not assume that SmithKline
knew or should have known in 1996 what they knew or should have known in 1998.153In a related reason, the
court determined that scientiﬁc evidence as it existed at the time of the Tobin trial could be diﬀerent for the
Coburn trial due to new studies or new interpretations of existing studies.154 Another reason for denying
the motion concerned a separate case pending against Pﬁzer, the makers of Zoloft. In Miller v. Pﬁzer,
149See id. (stating that, while Schell was found to be in some “vulnerable subpopulation” of Paxil users, the jury in that case
did not deﬁne that subpopulation. As such, the Tobin result may not be applicable to Coburn since he may not have been
aﬀected by the drug in the way that Schell was).
150See id. at 1238-39.




34Inc.155, the court’s independent experts found that plaintiﬀ expert witness Dr. Healy’s opinions had not
been accepted in the relevant scientiﬁc community.156As a result of this, the Coburn court refused to apply
collateral estoppel from the Tobin case since Dr. Healy’s testimony as an expert witness was an essential
part of the plaintiﬀs’ case in Tobin.157Instead, they decided that Utah would have to make a determination
as to Dr. Healy’s usefulness.
The Coburn court also reasoned that other similar cases had been decided in the direction of the defense,
including Forsyth.158Also, the court noted that the defendants in the Smith v. Pﬁzer, Inc.159case won by
summary judgment. Given these decisions and the fact that much of the evidence used by the plaintiﬀs is
applicable to all SSRIs,160the court further reasoned that the case at hand was one of substantial factual
question that could not be resolved simply based on the Tobin outcome.161 Finally, the court found it
“contrary to public policy to allow a single jury verdict to brand an entire product defective throughout
the country, particularly when there exists a signiﬁcant and ongoing debate in the scientiﬁc and medical
community about the issues involved in this and other SSRI cases”.162The court then goes on to note that
the plaintiﬀ may have been particularly sympathetic in the Tobin case, and that the Wyoming jury may
have been acting out against a drug that generates over $6 million per day for the manufacturer.163 So the
155Id. (citing as follows: Miller v. Pﬁzer, Inc., United States District Court for the District of Kansas, No. 99-2326-KHV).
156See id.
157See id. at 1240.
158See id.
159Id. (citing as follows: Smith, 2001 WL 968369).
160See id. (noting also that defendant will continue to argue that SSRIs should not be considered together scientiﬁcally and
legally).
161See id. at 1240 (stating that “these inconsistent verdicts against other manufacturers of SSRI medications militate against
applying collateral estoppel in this case”).
162Id. at 1241.
163See id. at 1241.
35Coburn court very clearly ruled that collateral estoppel was inapplicable, and it could be expected based
on the Coburn analysis that most other courts would rule the same way. As such, any further cases against
the SSRI manufacturers will likely have to be decided based on the speciﬁc facts of the particular case.
While the Tobin case may make a winning verdict seem like a less daunting prospect, the fact is that the
diﬃculty in actually getting the case to a jury tends to favor settlement. While settlement may be in the
best interest of judicial eﬃciency, it certainly does not help to answer the important underlying question
of whether SSRIs do create dangers above and beyond what users, doctors, the FDA, and society at large
would consider acceptable.
G. Concluding Remarks on the SSRI Link to Violent Behavior
The link between violent or suicidal behavior and SSRIs has produced a decade-long process of litigation
that has yielded virtually no precedent and no ﬁrm scientiﬁc answers. That may not suggest that it still
does not have the potential to result in huge liability for the drug producers, as there have been important
developments in that area in the last two years.164Until the evidence against them becomes more compelling,
however, the drug companies are unlikely to suﬀer the same fate as the tobacco companies.
III. SSRI Withdrawal Eﬀects
While the threat of litigation for the link between SSRIs and suicide and violence may seem controllable
to the drug manufacturers, there may be another storm of liability on the horizon that could prove (due
164Namely the Tobin case and the Sepracor patent issue.
36to the sheer number of plaintiﬀs who could bring suits) even more dangerous than the wrongful death and
injury cases. A recent and fast-growing trend involves allegations by users of SSRIs that those drugs have
resulted in a withdrawal syndrome, in which those who have used them suﬀer various side eﬀects when
they stop taking the medication. These side eﬀects can be quite serious, and for the most part there is no
warning given about the possibility of these withdrawal eﬀects. Although the package insert for Paxil does
include a mention of a withdrawal syndrome, it is reported in a way that makes side eﬀects seem relatively
rare.165Those who believe this insert is not enough argue that patients (and prescribing doctors) are not
given a clear enough picture of just how diﬃcult it may be to stop taking the drug and how long that process
may take.
Among the additions to the warning, according to critics, should be the more serious eﬀects that are
commonly reported, including electroshock sensations felt within the heads of those trying to quit the
drugs.166The manufacturers are clearly reluctant to provide such a warning, as that would tend to indicate
that the drugs are addictive, which could scare oﬀ some doctors and/or consumers from prescribing and/or
using the drugs.
Lawsuits have already been started by those who claim to be suﬀering from the withdrawal syndrome, both in
the form of class actions and in groups seeking injunctions against the marketing and sale of the drugs until the
label has been changed to warn of the potential withdrawal eﬀects.167 A. Science of the Withdrawal Syndrome
165The new label for Paxil, found at www.fda.gov/medwatch/SAFETY/2001/dec01.html and announced by the FDA on Decem-
ber 14, 2001, includes a warning related to the discontinuation of Paxil. The most commonly reported side eﬀect, according
to the label, is dizziness, which was found to occur in 7.1% of those who discontinued the drug on the tapered method of
discontinuation suggested on the label.
166The December 14, 2001 label change, at www.fda.gov/medwatch/SAFETY/2001/dec01.html, does note that side eﬀects such
as electric shock sensations have been reported, but it says that such events may not have a causal relationship to Paxil.
167See Baum, Hedlund, Aristei, Guilford & Shiavo, press release, 17 individuals ﬁle ﬁrst (non-class action) lawsuit seek-
ing damages against Smithkline Beecham for severe withdrawal reactions from the antidepressant, Paxil, (Jan. 25, 2002)
37The withdrawal syndrome, unlike other alleged consequences of taking SSRIs, diﬀers based on the partic-
ular SSRI that was used. The half-life of each drug varies, with Paxil having the shortest half-life.168The
SSRIs with the shortest half-lives leave the user’s blood the most quickly and thus are most likely to cause
quick and extreme withdrawal symptoms.169Prozac has the longest half-life of the SSRIs, which means that
the users are less likely to experience withdrawal eﬀects since the Prozac exits the system over a period of
weeks.170Even with the longer half-life, Dr. Robert Hedaya171says that “withdrawal symptoms take longer
to hit, but that doesn’t mean you won’t experience them in four or ﬁve weeks.”172Nevertheless, Eli Lilly does
appear again to be shielded from liability in this area, at least when compared to the other SSRI manufactur-
ers. In fact, one website had a question and answer session with a doctor who advised a potential suﬀerer of
Paxil withdrawal syndrome that “many authorities recommend switching to Prozac ﬁrst because it doesn’t
have the withdrawal symptoms because it slowly leaves the body.”173On the other end of the spectrum, and
the subject of virtually all of the talk about SSRI withdrawal, is Paxil. Paxil has the shortest half-life in the
group, and many users have reported severe eﬀects upon stopping their regular doses of the medication.174
http://www.bhagd.com/media/ssri/paxil/Paxil-17-release.htm. This release, in addition to providing the information in
the title of the press release, also notes that they ﬁled the ﬁrst class action against SmithKline Beecham related to Paxil
withdrawal on August 24, 2001, and that additional class action lawsuits have been initiated since that date.
168See Peter R. Breggin, M.D., The Antidepressant Fact Book 129 (2001).
169See A Painful Withdrawl: Unedited, Uncorrected Transcipt of ABC-TV 20-20 Program, (Aug. 25, 2000)
<www.socialaudit.org.uk/5106-990.html>.
170See id.
171Psychopharmacologist, Georgetown University professor, and author of “The Antidepressant Survival Guide”.
172Getting Oﬀ Antidepressants: Withdrawal Side Eﬀects of SSRIs Emerging, 20/20, (August 25, 2000)
<www.escapinghades.com/antidepressants.html>.
173Dr. Heller, Is It Paxil Withdrawal?, (visited Feb. 24, 2002) <http://www.biologicalunhappiness.com/AskDoc/PaxilWdr.htm>.
The advice that Prozac does not have signiﬁcant withdrawal symptoms directly conﬂicts with Dr. Breggin. See Peter R.
Breggin, M.D., The Antidepressant Fact Book 129 (Perseus Publishing 2001) (stating that “people do experience
withdrawal reactions from Prozac, usually starting several days or weeks after terminating the drug”).
174As evidenced by various lawsuits relating to Paxil withdrawal, television specials devoted to the topic, and multiple websites
devoted to establishing a sense of community among those claiming to suﬀer from Paxil withdrawal syndrome.
38B. SSRI Withdrawal, Television, and the Internet
One of the real phenomena that makes what is often referred to as Paxil withdrawal special is that the
individuals who suﬀer from the eﬀects, who would normally be isolated and have no way of knowing that
others were experiencing similar side eﬀects, are coming together on the internet. There are several web
sites where past Paxil users testify to the problems they have had with the drug.175Many of the contributors
to these sites express that they felt they were alone in suﬀering the side eﬀects of Paxil withdrawal before
ﬁnding others similarly situated on the internet. An example of this was seen by a national audience when
ABC’s “20/20” ran a segment on its August 25, 2000 program on the topic of Paxil withdrawal.176That
special has become a major point of emphasis among those who claim to be experiencing withdrawal eﬀects,
as they felt that it helped to publicize and legitimize their suﬀering.
The segment featured moderator Connie Chung leading a discussion of several former Paxil users who claimed
to have suﬀered from terrible post-use eﬀects of Paxil.177Dr. Nancy Snyderman acted as the medical expert
in the panel discussion.178Melissa Hall, who was one of the panelists on the program, said that she turned
to the internet as a last resort when she could not ﬁnd any doctors who seemed to understand the problems
she was experiencing after stopping her regimen of Paxil.179When she ﬁnally typed “Paxil withdrawal” into
an internet search engine, she said she found “hundreds of sites of people having the same exact symptoms”
that she had been experiencing.180Panelist Shari Loback had a similar experience. Upon ﬁnding that there
175Including: http://www.quitpaxil.org/; http://www.paxilprogress.org/; http://paxil.bizland.com/jbuzzw.htm; and
http://anxietyhelp.org/directory/meds/.
176A transcript of the “20/20” program was obtained on-line. A Painful Withdrawl: Unedited, Uncorrected Transcipt of





39were many others experiencing the same side eﬀects, she said she thought “Oh, my God. This is me and
nobody ever knew it. Nobody ever suggested that it was the Paxil.”181
While the speciﬁc stories found on the internet vary, those who tell their stories with Paxil withdrawal
troubles paint a similar picture of having their daily lives interrupted by the severity of the symptoms.
Tanya is a typical example. On a Harvard University forum, she wrote that after quitting Paxil (which
she was taking in an eﬀort to alleviate her migraine headaches) cold turkey, she “experienced the WORST
dizziness” and that her “whole world is constantly spinning.”182Furthermore, demonstrative of the dangers
of the more serious side eﬀects, she claims that she “got into a car accident Friday, and have not driven
since.”183Adding to Tonya’s frustration was the fact that her doctor told her that the Paxil stoppage had
nothing to do with her illness and that she probably just had a virus.184While that doctor’s assessment
may have been correct, the total disregard for her problems left her dumbfounded, and she stated that she
was considering a move back to England “just to have the support of my family while seeking care.”185 C.
Does Paxil Withdrawal Really Exist?
Whether an actual withdrawal syndrome exists is debatable, at least to the extent that many of the suﬀerers
claim. Just as the link between SSRIs and violence and suicide remains unproved, so too does the extent
of the withdrawal eﬀects of these drugs. Dr. Nancy Snyderman, however, indicated that she had spoken
181Id.




40“with over 50 people who say they suﬀered from similar problems,”186and these numbers multiply quickly
upon taking a quick survey of the internet sites devoted to those who claim to be part of this group of
suﬀerers. The problems Dr. Snyderman mentioned were “headaches, nausea, electric-shock sensations, and
confusion.”187While the headaches and nausea may seem trivial and not likely to trigger widespread tort
liability for the manufacturers, that may not be accurate. These symptoms have reportedly been so severe
as to render it impossible for those suﬀering the symptoms from conducting their daily activities such as
going to work. Melissa Hall, for example, said that she “didn’t work for two months” and that she “just laid
on my couch waiting for the dizziness and nausea and everything to go away.”188“There’s no question” the
withdrawal diﬃculties are real, says Dr. Hedaya.189 Another source that believes in the Paxil withdrawal
syndrome is the World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO has stated that “Paxil has the highest
incidence rate of withdrawal adverse experiences of any antidepressant drug in the world.”190Although it
is not clear how many of the total users suﬀer some withdrawal eﬀects, the estimates and studies range as
high a 85% of people taking all SSRI antidepressants.191This is in comparison to the 1-2% number that
SmithKline’s spokesman had claimed for Paxil,192and the 7% ﬁgure on the current Paxil label.193While the
exact percentage is debated, in each case it is a statistically signiﬁcant number of users who suﬀer upon





190Paxil Side Eﬀects Lawsuits, (visited Feb. 24, 2002) <www.paxil-side-effects-lawsuits.com/pages/withdrawals.html>.
191See id.
192Alison Tonks, Withdrawal from paroxetine can be severe, warns FDA, British Medical Journal, (Feb. 2, 2002)
<http://bmj.com/cgi/content/full/324/7332/260> (stating that a company spokesman for GlaxoSmithKline had called with-
drawal symptoms for Paxil “very rare” and noted that they occur in only two out of every 1,000 patients).
193From www.fda.gov/medwatch/SAFETY/2001/dec01.html.
41stopping their doses.
A related problem with the understatement of withdrawal eﬀects and the failure to have them legitimized
is that is makes an already vulnerable population of depressed people feel crazy. Dr. Snyderman suggests
that experts call this feeling among depressed people a “dangerous state of mind”.194 Those who deny
the existence of a widespread syndrome, at least in a more serious form, discredit much of the evidence by
calling it anecdotal.195In scientiﬁc circles, this is critical, as the methods and processes of trained scientists
are thought to be the only to way to produce a reliable and useful result. Perhaps because many of the critics
of SSRIs use anecdotal evidence, the advocates for reform generally suggest that there be further testing
and study required by the FDA based on all of the reported problems rather than an outright present ban
of the drugs.
Dr. David Wheadon of SmithKline says that to the extent the problems do occur, they are not severe and
do not last long.196Retreating to one of the most successful and frequently used pharmaceutical company
strategies, he also raises the point that people may be confusing withdrawal symptoms for what may in fact
be a return of the problem that originally led one to begin taking the antidepressant.197This is a win-win
argument for the company, as it deﬂects the possibility of a withdrawal syndrome while at the same time
suggesting that the former user should perhaps begin to take the drug again to make the symptoms come to a
194A Painful Withdrawl: Unedited, Uncorrected Transcipt of ABC-TV 20-20 Program, (Aug. 25, 2000)
<www.socialaudit.org.uk/5106-990.html>.
195See Craig Oﬀman, Prozac indignation: How a little-known Harvard clinician needled sleeping giant Eli Lilly, (May 17,
2000) <www.salon.com/health/feature/2000/05/17/backlash/> (quoting Eli Lilly marketing and communications associate
Laura Miller, in commenting about Dr. Glenmullens’ Prozac Backlash: “It’s full of anecdotes that will frighten people oﬀ their
medication. It’s a disservice to all patients”).
196See Alison Tonks, Withdrawal from paroxetine can be severe, warns FDA, British Medical Journal, (Feb. 2, 2002)
<http://bmj.com/cgi/content/full/324/7332/260>.
197See A Painful Withdrawl: Unedited, Uncorrected Transcipt of ABC-TV 20-20 Program, (Aug. 25, 2000)
<www.socialaudit.org.uk/5106-990.html>.
42stop! When asked by Dr. Snyderman about the fact that the supposed withdrawal symptoms are symptoms
that the patient had never previously experienced, Dr. Wheadon responded that “when that illness recurs”,
you are not guaranteed to “have the same sort of symptoms.”198This, despite being true, does not address
such symptoms as feelings of electroshock, which have never been known to be a sign of depression or other
illnesses Paxil is used to treat.
The previously mentioned “20/20” panelist, Melissa Hall, made the ironic point that one of the reasons she
started taking Paxil was that her doctor told her that there were few side eﬀects from starting the drug.199This
is a clear indication of what critics say is wrong with the current state of aﬀairs. They argue that the drug
companies know that many of these withdrawal eﬀects are serious and legitimate, and that by not provid-
ing an appropriate warning to doctors and consumers they are unnecessarily subjecting the patients to painful
and discomforting eﬀects of quitting the drug.200 D. Has the Medical Community Responded to Possible Withdrawal Eﬀects?
The belief that many doctors do not understand the potential eﬀects of discontinuing SSRI use has been
conﬁrmed by at least one study. The Journal of Clinical Psychiatry reported that “as many as 70% of gen-
eral practitioners and 30% of psychiatrists do not know about the side eﬀects of ending serotonin-boosting
drugs.”201This problem is exacerbated by the fact that there is an even further problem with getting the
doctor’s knowledge relayed to the patient. The same Journal of Clinical Psychiatry report found that of
those doctors who did know about the SSRI side eﬀects, “only 20% of psychiatrists and 17% of general
practitioners caution their patients about the proper way to slowly lower the levels of these drugs to come
198Id.
199See id.
200See Joseph Glenmullen, M.D., Prozac Backlash 61 (2001).
201Robin Eisner, Falling Oﬀ Prozac, (May 24, 2001) <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/living/DailyNews/ssri000524.html>.
43oﬀ them.”202Thus, only about 5.1% of patients of general practitioners and 14% of patients of psychiatrists
are counseled on the proper way to stop taking these drugs. This is the type of gap that activists in the
area are trying to correct through mass publicity, lawsuits, new labels, and doctor education. “Getting oﬀ
these drugs properly is an issue that is underappreciated,” says Dr. Alexander Bodkin, who is the director
of the clinical psychopharmacology research program at Harvard Medical School aﬃliate McLean Hospital
in Belmont, Massachusetts.203 E. A New Paxil Label
The latest piece of news in this area is a positive development for those who have contended all along that
there is a serious withdrawal syndrome. That development is a new label that was approved for Paxil as part
of approving the drug for use in the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder.204The new label includes
recognition of a more severe problem with discontinuation205of Paxil than had been previously admitted by
the company, although the warning does stop short of stating that there is a causal link between the drug’s
discontinuation and the symptoms.206The bulk of the new label deals with the importance of a gradual re-
duction in dosage as opposed to an abrupt discontinuation of the medication.207The label also indicates that
resuming treatment with the previously prescribed dose may be considered if the patient shows intolerable
symptoms of the discontinuation program.208After this, the recommendation is to once again attempt to
202Id.
203Id.
204See Baum, Hedlund, Aristei, Guilford & Shiavo, press release, 17 individuals ﬁle ﬁrst (non-class action) lawsuit seek-
ing damages against Smithkline Beecham for severe withdrawal reactions from the antidepressant, Paxil, (Jan. 25, 2002)
http://www.bhagd.com/media/ssri/paxil/Paxil-17-release.htm.
205“Discontinuation” is preferred to “withdrawal” by the drug makers due to the fact that “withdrawal” is associ-
ated more with addictive drugs. See Peter R. Breggin, M.D., GSK Updates the Paxil Label, (viewed Feb. 24, 2002)
http://www.breggin.com/paxilwithdrawalsuit.html.
206From www.fda.gov/medwatch/SAFETY/2001/dec01.html (stating that “During Paxil marketing, there have been sponta-
neous reports of similar adverse events, which may have no causal relationship to the drug, upon the discontinuation of Paxil
(particularly when abrupt)”).
207From www.fda.gov/medwatch/SAFETY/2001/dec01.html (stating that “A gradual reduction in the dose rather than abrupt
cessation is recommended whenever possible”).
208From www.fda.gov/medwatch/SAFETY/2001/dec01.html (stating that “If intolerable symptoms occur following a decrease
44taper the patient oﬀ of the drug at an ever more gradual rate.209 As a result of this new label, one of the
ﬁrst class-actions suits against SmithKline was voluntarily dismissed.210One of the lawyers who brought the
suit, Don Farber, told Dr. Breggin that “it is highly likely that the suit inﬂuenced both the drug company
and the FDA to strengthen the label in regard to Paxil withdrawal eﬀects.”211This is a demonstration of the
eﬀectiveness of lawsuits in motivating the drug companies to take steps to protect and inform the consuming
public.
Some critics, including Dr. Breggin, believe the amended label does not go far enough in warning consumers
and doctors of the dangers of withdrawing from Paxil and other drugs. Dr. Breggin says that use of the term
“discontinuation” rather than “withdrawal” allows the drug maker to obscure “the potential severity of these
symptoms and their tendency to force patients to continue taking the drug.”212He goes on to say that the
new Paxil label is “grossly inadequate in regard to the range, intensity, and persistence of Paxil withdrawal
reactions, including the danger of aggressive, violent, or suicidal behavior, and an overall worsening of the
patient’s medical condition.”213
An additional noteworthy item is that the British Medical Journal’s online edition reported that the Inter-
in the dose or upon discontinuation of treatment, then resuming the previously prescribed dose may be considered”).
209From www.fda.gov/medwatch/SAFETY/2001/dec01.html (stating that “Subsequently, the physician may continue decreasing
the dose but at a more gradual rate”).





45national Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association recently “declared the company guilty of
misleading the public about paroxetine (the chemical name for Paxil) on US television.”214The Association’s
consideration of this issue came as a result of a complaint ﬁled by Charles Medawar, who is the head of a
consumer research group named Social Audit.215The misleading information that the Association refers to
is the statement of SmithKline’s Dr. Wheadon, who said, as noted above, that the withdrawal symptoms
are only found in one or two of 1,000 people who stop taking the drug.216After considering the statements
made by Dr. Wheadon, the Association ruled that they were promotional and wrong.217In fact, the new
FDA label shows that clinical studies found that 7.1% of patients suﬀered dizziness as part of the aftereﬀects
of a program in which the drug was discontinued gradually before being abruptly stopped at 20mg/day.218
F. Judicial Awareness of SSRI Withdrawal Eﬀects
Although there have been no cases brought to a decision on the issue of SSRI withdrawal, there is an in-
dication that at least one court has already accepted the view that such a problem exists. In McClure
v. Walgreen Co.219, the court held that Walgreen’s incorrectly ﬁlled a Pepcid (antacid) prescription with
Paxil.220After being informed of the error, Walgreen’s did not inform the patient of any Paxil withdrawal
eﬀects.221The patient was then hurt twelve days after discontinuing the Paxil, in a fall that was attributed






219McClure v. Walgreen Co., 613 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa, 2000).
220See id. at 229.
221See id. at 231 (stating that “contrary to pharmacy standards and its own policy manual, Walgreen neglected to warn Shari
or her family of such adverse side eﬀects”).
46by doctors to dizziness brought on by Paxil withdrawal.222“What made Walgreen’s conduct particularly
egregious”, stated the decision of the court, “was its failure to warn Shari or her doctors of the serious side
eﬀects associated with Paxil and the abrupt discontinuance of the drug.”223Although the purpose of this case
was not to debate side eﬀects of the discontinuance of Paxil use,224the court’s assumption that these eﬀects
exist may further add to what seems to be a common belief among past users that this is an unquestionable
fact. While far from establishing as fact the existence of a Paxil withdrawal syndrome, the McClure court
does bolster the critics of the drug by assuming what is argued to some degree by SmithKline.
Among the recent lawsuits that have been recently publicized is one that was ﬁled on January 25, 2002 by
17 people who claim to have suﬀered from the Paxil withdrawal eﬀects.225The attorneys representing the
plaintiﬀs claim that this is the ﬁrst non-class action lawsuit of this kind, and that “class action lawsuits have
been cropping up across the country related to Paxil withdrawal ever since” their ﬁrst such suit was ﬁled
against SmithKline on August 24, 2001.226The strategy of the ﬁrm bringing this new suit seems to be to
stress the stability and normalcy of the individual plaintiﬀs, which was a problem in the cases trying to link
SSRIs to violent and suicidal behavior. Among the plaintiﬀs in the new case are a research doctor and a
pharmacist.227In addition, having medically educated people claim that they were unaware of this syndrome
will add to the plaintiﬀs’ case that the previously used warning was not enough to indicate the true severity
of the withdrawal problems.
222See id. at 229 (stating that “On September 9, 1997...she fell again because of dizziness” and “Medical testimony attributed
this fall to symptoms of a withdrawal syndrome associated with the abrupt discontinuance of Paxil”).
223Id. at 231.
224See id. The opinion at no point mentions any argument by the defendant that the Paxil withdrawal symptoms are a ﬁction.
225See Baum, Hedlund, Aristei, Guilford & Shiavo, press release, 17 individuals ﬁle ﬁrst (non-class action) lawsuit seek-




47G. Concluding Remarks on SSRI Withdrawal
As with the link to suicide and violence, one of the major issues with withdrawal syndrome is the need for
more research. The companies have little incentive to do this research, as they are reliant on the revenues
generated by these antidepressants. Dr. Peter Haddad, consultant psychiatrist at Mental Health Service NHS
Trust in Salford, England, believes that these types of problems should be addressed before any approvals of
new antidepressant drugs.228“This is a seriously under-researched area”, Dr. Haddad has said.229“There’s
no good evidence to help doctors get the dosing right as patients come oﬀ treatment. It’s still a matter of
trial and error.”230This observation is an important one, as the ability to administer eﬀective health-care
should be one of the main objectives of the regulatory authorities. In a case such as this one, where negative
eﬀects of a drug become known as at least reasonably possible based on anecdotal evidence, the FDA should
have the authority to order further testing to keep the drug on the market. A reasonable time could be
given to conduct these tests, and the drug companies would have plenty of incentive to conduct the tests
given their reliance on the revenue from these drugs. Short of this solution, the types of problems discussed
by current and past SSRI users, as well as some health-care providers and scientists, will continue to occur,
as doctors have no reason to suspect that they should administer drugs such as these SSRIs diﬀerently than
other types of drugs they prescribe.




48IV. Are SSRIs Over-Prescribed?
A ﬁnal area that must be discussed involving SSRIs is one that has been the subject of substantial de-
bate. The issue is whether the SSRIs are being over-prescribed. Many doctors today believe that far too
many prescriptions are being written for SSRIs. “I feel we have a national health-care crisis,” Dr. Glen-
mullen observed.231“These antidepressants are being vastly over-prescribed, while their dangers are being
ignored.”232These critics further claim that it is problematic that the drugs are being prescribed for far
broader uses than those for which they were approved (oﬀ-label uses) by the FDA.233A related and scary
issue is that children are also receiving mass quantities of SSRIs despite the fact there has been little speciﬁc
FDA approval for treatment of children.
While it is unquestioned that millions of people are taking SSRIs, the supporters of the drugs argue that their
use is helping those millions of people live happier, more productive lives.234The critics, however, believes
that the proﬁtability of the drugs is leading the industry to push them beyond their intended purposes and
to people whose beneﬁts from the drug could be exceeded by far by the possible problems that were discussed
231Judith Blake, Drugs and depression: How much is too much?, Seattle Times, (Apr. 12, 2000)
<http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/lifestyles/html98/proz12 20000412.html>.
232Id.
233See Todd Zwillich, SSRI Prescribing in Primary Care Draws Fire, Clinical Psychiatry News, (visited Mar. 10, 2002)
http://www.drugawareness.org/Oldsite/admissions.html (citing Stephen Crystal, Ph.D., who researches prescribing trends
at Rutgers University, for the proposition that “research is beginning to show that large numbers of prescriptions for selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) aren’t accompanied by a diagnosis of depression or any other mental condition”).
234See The National Institute of Mental Health, (visited Mar. 4, 2002) <www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/numbers.cfm> (citing
information that supports the advocates of increased diagnosis of mental illness. The NIMH cites a study that 22.1% of
American adults “suﬀer from a diagnosable mental disorder in a given year.” The same study then shows that more than 9%
of adults have some kind of depression disorder, and that women are almost twice as likely as men to have such a depression
disorder in a given year).
49in the prior parts of this paper.
A. Approved Uses for SSRIs
Although the approved uses do not limit the illnesses for which the antidepressants may be described, the
growing list of approved problems for some of the SSRIs is, according to some, indicative of a desire by the
manufacturers to use the drugs as panaceas. The most recent trend has been FDA approval of SSRIs for
various anxiety disorders235, which critics claim are akin to shyness and should not be corrected with serious
medication. The clear eﬀect of approval for problems that could be considered commonplace is that the
drug companies are able to target a wide segment of the population as potential users of their products. By
broadening their consumer base, the drug companies are able to signiﬁcantly expand their potential revenue.
B. Mental Health Professionals vs. Primary Care Physicians
A problem closely related to the prior point is that many of these antidepressants are being prescribed by
primary care doctors rather than psychiatric doctors who could more appropriately determine the condition
of the patient.236Part of this is due to the growth of HMOs, as the HMO primary care physician is pressured
to refer as little as possible to specialists given the costliness of such specialists.237
Some experts believe that the participation of primary care physicians is not a problem, or at least that the
beneﬁts of primary care doctor participation outweigh any of the perceived problems. Although primary
235See id. (stating that a staggering 13.3% of Americans aged 18-54 suﬀer from some type of anxiety disorder in a given year.
It lists “panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and phobias
(including social phobia)” as examples of anxiety disorders).
236See Todd Zwillich, SSRI Prescribing in Primary Care Draws Fire, Clinical Psychiatry News, (visited Mar. 10, 2002)
http://www.drugawareness.org/Oldsite/admissions.html (stating that “while an estimated 11 million psychiatrist appoint-
ments included an antidepressant prescription in 1994, more than 10 million other antidepressant prescriptions were written by
primary care doctors”).
237See id.
50care doctors are less experienced with psychological conditions than psychiatrists, they are gaining more
experience with the drugs and their eﬀects as a result of having so many patients using them.238Additionally,
the use of less costly primary care physicians is thought to provide access to these drugs to a much more
diverse range of patients.239“Those who are underserved by specialists are nonwhite and not wealthy. They
are the ones who beneﬁt most from primary care physician prescribing,” said psychiatrist Dr. Gregory
Simon.240This increase in availability can be viewed as a positive impact of increased primary care physician
participation, assuming that the beneﬁts of the drugs outweigh their social costs.241
C. Other Side Eﬀects of SSRIs
Although some of the problems associated with SSRIs have been widely disputed as discussed previously in
this paper, there are some side eﬀects that are admitted and acknowledged by the manufacturers (although
just how often those side eﬀects manifest is an oft-disputed point). An example of this is sexual dysfunction,
which has been linked to the SSRIs and acknowledged by the manufacturers. In Dr. Glenmullen’s book,
he holds that up to 60% of Prozac users experience sexual dysfunction.242While Eli Lilly admits to the
eﬀect, their estimate is in the 20-30% of users range.243The inability of the drug companies to recognize and
disclose the magnitude of side eﬀects is magniﬁed even more when looking at the fact that Eli Lilly’s labels




241An assumption that is speculative given the conﬂicting opinions presented in this paper on the level of eﬀectiveness of these
drugs as compared to their potential harms.




51there will generally be more accurate information reported about the side eﬀects of SSRIs after more time is
allowed to study such eﬀects. In the meantime, however, a large volume of the public (28 million Americans
according to one study)245 is being exposed to a set of drugs that may have more far-reaching eﬀects than
originally thought.
While it is typically the case for any prescription medication that more will be known about the drug after
the public uses it for years, the widespread prescription of the SSRI drugs is deemed by some to subject
patients to an unnecessary risk of eﬀects of drugs that they do not need. Dr. Glenmullen, unlike some of
the other critics of the SSRIs, does not avoid prescribing them to his patients.246 Instead, he practices and
preaches a more judicious method of treatment, in which such drugs are only prescribed for those who are
suﬀering from more serious mental illnesses.247
Critics of the manufacturers suggest that the doctors are being under-informed about the risks of SSRIs,
and are therefore passing out the drugs without requiring that the condition in question be serious enough
to warrant the medicine. They claim that the ease of ﬁrst time prescription and then the future ease
of renewal is not consistent with the dangers of the prescribed medication.248 Dr. Breggin drives home
the point that these drugs are too easily obtained by suggesting that the SSRIs have eﬀects that mimic
245See Nicholas Regush, More Prozac Backlash: Drug Firm Attacks Prozac Book, But Lacks Long-Term Data, (visited Feb.
27, 2002) <http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/living/SecondOpinion/secondopinion 80.html>.
246See Judith Blake, Drugs and depression: How much is too much?, Seattle Times, (Apr. 12, 2000)
<http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/lifestyles/html98/proz12 20000412.html>.
247See Robin Eisner, Falling Oﬀ Prozac, (May 24, 2001) <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/living/DailyNews/ssri000524.html>
(stating that “Glenmullen says today the serotonin boosters are being prescribed for more and more moderate conditions, but
that they should be reserved for people who are truly debilitated by their mental illness”).
248See Judith Blake, Drugs and depression: How much is too much?, Seattle Times, (Apr. 12, 2000)
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/lifestyles/html98/proz12 20000412.html (noting a Glenmullen account of a pa-
tient “who received a six-month prescription for an antidepressant from an emergency-room doctor after her second visit for a
panic attack”).
52amphetamines or cocaine.249 If Dr. Breggin and others are right about the dangers of SSRIs, it is diﬃcult
to justify the prescription of such drugs for relatively minor problems such as shyness, headaches, or weight
gain concerns. Many doctors still doubt these dangers, however, and prescribe the SSRIs for virtually any
ailment, regardless of whether it is considered to be strictly a mental health problem. Dr. Donald Black,
President of the American Academy of Clinical Psychology, is a believer in both the safety and eﬀectiveness
of the SSRIs and thus disputes the claims of SSRI critics. He has called them “remarkably safe and versatile,”
and has even prescribed the antidepressants to help prevent patients from biting their ﬁngernails.250
D. SSRIs for Children
Another criticized practice is the proliferation of SSRI prescriptions for children.251 The FDA has not
speciﬁcally approved most of the SSRIs for use in children, but rather gives a blanket approval for the drugs
based on adult testing for safety and eﬀectiveness.252 Despite the fact that the most successful SSRIs are
have not been speciﬁcally approved for children, doctors can prescribe them to children at their discretion.253
Critics believe this is a dangerous thing to do, as the labeling relates to adults, and because dosages cannot
simply be cut by certain percentages based on body weight or some other measure to be used safely and
eﬀectively.254 The only real solution to this problem is for the drug companies to test the products on
children in order to gain speciﬁc FDA approval255, which they have already done or are beginning to do for
the most popular SSRIs. Until the speciﬁc approval, however, the companies will continue to quietly market
the products for use in children. Evidence of this is found in the fact that most of the SSRIs are already
249See Peter R. Breggin, M.D., The Antidepressant Fact Book 56 (2001).
250Judith Blake, Drugs and depression: How much is too much?, Seattle Times, (Apr. 12, 2000)
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/lifestyles/html98/proz12 20000412.html.
251See Dr. Joseph Glenmullen, (May 24, 2000) <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/living/DailyNews/000524 prozac glenmullen chat.html>
(stating that he was “very concerned about the huge number of children that are being prescribed these antidepressants”).
252See Leticia M. Diaz, Esq., Regulating the Administration of Mood-Altering Drugs to Juveniles: Are We Legally Drugging
Our Children?, 25 Seton Hall Legis. J. 83, 97 (2001) (presentnig a chart showing that Zoloft and Luvox are approved for
children with respect to obsessive compulsive disorder).
253See Elyse Tanouye, Pharmaceuticals: Antidepressant Makers Study Kids’ Market, The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 4,
1997, at B1.
254See Leticia M. Diaz, Esq., Regulating the Administration of Mood-Altering Drugs to Juveniles: Are We Legally Drugging
Our Children?, 25 Seton Hall Legis. J. 83, 100 (2001).
255See id. at 104.
53oﬀered in forms that are more palatable to children, including a minty ﬂavored Prozac.256 While there is
nothing illegal or possibly even unethical about such marketing toward prescription for children, the dangers
are unknown and critics believe speciﬁc testing is in the best interest of this vulnerable population.
Critics also suggest that SSRIs that have not been speciﬁcally tested for pediatric use present a special
problem because parents often are not aware that the drugs have not been tested on or approved for children.
“Parents are in a very diﬃcult situation of having to make the best judgment with their physicians, without
data,” says Peter Jensen, an oﬃcial at the National Institutes of Health.257Nonetheless, about 580,000
children received prescriptions for Prozac, Paxil, or Zoloft in 1996, according to IMS America Ltd., a research
ﬁrm.258 Another ﬁrm, Scott-Levin Inc. says that children account for about 4% of all prescriptions for
antidepressants.259These large numbers are part of a larger problem seen by Dr. Glenmullen, who has stated
that “children are the tip of the iceberg” and that “I think it’s just a reﬂection of the irrational way they’re
being prescribed across the board that we’re seeing them so commonly prescribed to children.”260
While this may be cause for concern, many people assume, perhaps rationally, that the FDA would not allow
the practice of prescribing medications to children and adults if they had reason to believe that there was
a greater risk of dangers to children than adults from taking the drugs. Thus, in this case the companies
may appropriately be able to cite the FDA policy as a justiﬁcation for the way they promote the drug to be
useful for children and adults. It is unquestioned that the FDA knows the drugs are being widely prescribed
to children in practice. Dr. Thomas Laughren, FDA team leader for psychiatric drug products, admitted





260Dr. Joseph Glenmullen, (May 24, 2000) <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/living/DailyNews/000524 prozac glenmullen chat.html>.
54“if we approve a drug for depression in adults, we know it be applied in kids.”261 The FDA, therefore, has
urged the companies to conduct testing on children given that this class of drugs is already being so widely
prescribed to youths.262 The companies are responding to this, and are seeking approval in many cases for
the SSRIs for use in children.263 In the meantime, their primary defense to the critics of the widespread
treatment of children with SSRIs is that the drugs are serving an important need by helping some of the
millions of children in America who are thought to suﬀer from depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder.
Some have worried that the dangers of the drugs, particularly with respect to prescribing them to children,
have manifested themselves in several of the mass school shootings that have been well-publicized in recent
years. In several of those cases, one or more of the shooters was taking an SSRI.264 The most famous of those
cases is Eric Harris, one of the two shooters at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. Harris was
taking Luvox at the time of the shootings,265 which is actually FDA approved for children up to the age of
17 for the treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder.266 Although the scientiﬁc proof in linking children’s
violent behavior to the SSRIs is no more compelling than the link between adult violent behavior and SSRIs
that was discussed above, the high-proﬁle nature of these publicized homicidal students who turn out to
have taken an SSRI provides additional worry for the drug companies.
E. Concluding Remarks on the Possible Over-Prescription of SSRIs
261Leticia M. Diaz, Esq., Regulating the Administration of Mood-Altering Drugs to Juveniles: Are We Legally Drugging Our
Children?, 25 Seton Hall Legis. J. 83, 99 (2001).
262See id. at 100.
263See Elyse Tanouye, Pharmaceuticals: Antidepressant Makers Study Kids’ Market, The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 4,
1997, at B1.
264See Leticia M. Diaz, Esq., Regulating the Administration of Mood-Altering Drugs to Juveniles: Are We Legally Drugging
Our Children?, 25 Seton Hall Legis. J. 83, 90-91 (2001) (stating that eighteen-year-old high school senior Eric Harris killed
13 people after having taken Luvox, and that 15-year-old Oregon high school student Kip Kinkel was taking Ritalin and Prozac
before killing his parents and two students).
265See id. at 85.
266See id. at n.11.
55From a liability standpoint, it seems that the increasingly widespread prescription of SSRIs puts the drug
companies on the same footing as with the other areas discussed in this paper. They seem to be faced
with liability only if eventual plaintiﬀs are able to show that there was a detrimental eﬀect of the drug that
the company knew or should have known about, and then did not warn either the doctor or possibly the
consumer of the detrimental eﬀect. Therefore, doctrinally there is no reason for the drug companies to not
extend the marketing and eventual sale of their product to as large a market as possible. Where the trouble
might occur, however, is with two areas.
First, those who are taking the medication for less serious mental health problems, or even for problems
totally unrelated to the approved purposes, may eventually be able to bring claims more easily using some
type of balancing analysis in which the lesser need for medication could require a lower standard in ﬁnding
liability against the drug company where the drug turns out to have eﬀects that far outweighed the original
problem. The second possible liability problem for manufacturers is that the broad use of SSRIs for children
may subject the drug companies to liability more easily given jury sympathies in cases involving children and
given that children (who will someday be adults who may have been aﬀected by the drugs) cannot properly
evaluate for themselves the eﬀects of the drugs.
While no such cases have been brought simply based on having a certain status among the group of SSRI
users, it is on the outskirts of possibilities. Undoubtedly the drug companies have assessed this risk and
weighed it against the increased revenue from extending the product to a broad user base. If there are, as
has been suggested, 28 million Americans taking these drugs, however, and if there eventually is a conclusive
ﬁnding that the eﬀects are on the more serious side of the spectrum of possibilities, there will be a liability
56and public health disaster that could rival and exceed some of the greatest ones in U.S. history (i.e. smoking,
asbestos, breast implants, etc.). It must be stressed that what is unique in this last situation (the potential
problem of over-prescription) is that the drugs are believed by many to possess very serious harms, while
the problems for which the drugs are being diagnosed are often not at a corresponding level of seriousness.
The drug company shield from liability, in which some risk is allowed given the existence of a greater health
beneﬁt to some segment of the population, may not apply when the prescriptions are being given to cure
nail biting and other minor problems.
V. Conclusions
The drug companies have largely been able to avoid liability related to the SSRIs, particularly the publicized
types of liability that occur beyond the realm of settlement. Given that the primary means for imposing
liability have been and will continue to be a failure to warn and the related failure to further test the
drugs upon knowledge that some problem may exist, it will be diﬃcult for plaintiﬀs to be more successful
against the companies absent some sort of smoking gun. That smoking gun would likely need to be internal
documents showing that the companies knew or should have known of some danger and did not act to
address that danger.
The wording on the Sepracor patent, while certainly not helpful to Eli Lilly, likely falls short of the necessary
smoking gun. While Eli Lilly surely knew of the wording when acquiring the rights to the patent, they will
continue to base their side on the fact that it was Sepracor, not Eli Lilly, who wrote that description. Eli
Lilly can most likely point out that the drug was patentable and novel for reasons other than the claimed
diﬀerences from Prozac in serious side eﬀects. Thus, this single piece of information will probably not produce
as great a change as the plaintiﬀs attorneys and other drug company critics would hope.
The Tobin decision, while serving as an important conﬁdence-builder for plaintiﬀs attorneys, will probably
not have the kind of precedential value that will greatly increase the chances for plaintiﬀ victory in future
57cases. The fact-speciﬁc nature of these cases, along with the fact that there has been no judicial unanimity
in this matter, will prevent future plaintiﬀs from being assured of future success based on the single outcome
of Tobin.
It is more diﬃcult to speculate as to the possible liability for the alleged withdrawal syndrome. While the
suﬀerers do have side eﬀects that cause pain and suﬀering and ﬁnancial loss, the magnitude of each individual
case is far less than in the wrongful death situations. This is combined, however, with a drastically higher
number of possible plaintiﬀs. It seems that the fact that a much greater percentage of users suﬀer from
withdrawal problems than become suicidal or violent would make it more likely for the drug companies to
have discovered this problem during its initial testing of the products. While their samples may not have
yielded an accurate percentage, it is very probable that some knowledge of the problem would have developed
if the problem is currently as great as some claim. Thus, if there is conclusive evidence of the existence of
the withdrawal syndrome occurring on a broad scale, there may be an opening for plaintiﬀs to claim that
the drug company did know or should have known about the problem and should be liable for failing to act
upon that knowledge.
The opinion that the drugs are over-prescribed presents a greater total liability potential, but the existence of
liability hinges on the same problems of proof that are blocking liability for violent behavior and a withdrawal
syndrome. One possible diﬀerence in this area may be that it diminishes the drug companies’ argument that
the aﬀected person was predisposed to his or her behavior before having taken the drug. Although it may
be true that Joseph Wesbecker had shown violent tendencies before ever having taken Prozac, that kind of
evidence will be much more diﬃcult to produce for a user who suﬀers from eﬀects of an SSRI after having
taken the drug for a minor issue such as weight loss.
The debate over this area is a vibrant one. Both sides do present what looks like compelling evidence, both
scientiﬁc and otherwise. The stakes are high, both from a public health and an industry liability standpoint.
58Given these things, I would be in favor of a move by the FDA to launch a thorough investigation into these
drugs. This is also the approach favored by Nicholas Regush, who produces medical features for ABC News.
He speculated that the government may need to “do long-term studies on the impacts of these drugs as the
pharmaceutical companies have little incentive at this point to do it because the drugs have been on the
market for seven years.”267 If nothing else, an FDA sponsored review of the drugs by an independent group
of scientists would appease those who claim that the companies and the FDA are hiding behind faulty tests
that were rigged by the companies to help them obtain a favorable outcome with the FDA.
There is a substantial amount of mistrust of the drug companies by a signiﬁcant part of the public with
respect to these drugs, and that problem could be corrected by a thorough, independent study. The role
of the FDA is in large part to protect consumers, and the evidence warrants that the FDA take steps to
ensure consumer safety. With the large and growing number of people who have taken or are currently
taking SSRIs, this project should be given extremely high priority. If it turns out that the problems are at
the higher end of the range of possibilities, the long-term eﬀects could be disastrous. If the studies proved
inconclusive or if the greater problems were not found, the public and the drug companies could breathe a
deep sigh of relief and the doctors could again feel conﬁdent in their ability to control the known eﬀects in
their own best medical judgment.
267Nicholas Regush, More Prozac Backlash: Drug Firm Attacks Prozac Book, But Lacks Long-Term Data, (visited Feb. 27,
2002) <http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/living/SecondOpinion/secondopinion 80.html>.
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